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A prolonged business depression usually gives
i
I
birth to many new theories of economics and finance. Not
I
jj
only do new theories find their v/ay into the public forum
but old ones are frequently revived. Sometimes they re-
appear in their original form, but often they are modified,
presumably to meet new and changed conditions. The present
’ situation is no exception, and among the numerous plans
I
|l advocated as a solution to our present problems is the re-
1
monetization of silver.
From the discussion stage the movement to re-
monetize silver has advanced rapidly, culminating on
I
August 9, 1934, in a presidential proclamation for the
I
!
nationalization of the v/hite metal.
I Our aim here will be to investigate the background
!
and growth of the silver movement; to record the numerous de
|j
velopments in the movement, especially since the year 1920;
i! and finally, to attempt an evaluation of the case for, and
I’
the recent developments toward, the remonetization of silver
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CHAPTER I
THE BACKGROUND OF THE SILVER MOVEMENT
The Establishment of Bimetallism
The mint act of Anril 2, 1792, established the
coinage system of the United States. It -orovided, among
other things, for the free and gratuitous coinage of both
gold and silver at the ratio of fifteen to one. Gold, then,
was assigned a value fifteen times that of silver. This
renresented an attempt on the part of Congress to establish
an eauation between the mint and market ratios of the tvro
metals. It was discovered afterwards, however, that the
market ratio between gold and silver vias approximately fif-
teen and one-half to one instead of fifteen to one. In
other words. Congress had overvalued silver in relation to
gold v;ith the result that gold soon disappeared from circu-
lation.
In an effort to rectify the discrepancy between
the mint and market ratios and to bring gold back into cir-
culation, Congress in 1834 changed the ratio to sixteen to
one. This, however, was an error on the other side, for,
as the market ratio of gold to silver was still about fif-
teen and one-half to one, gold was now overvalued. Silver
became worth more as bullion than as coin, and consequently
was no longer brought to the mint for coinage. Silver coins
soon disappeared from circulation.
Virile *io i'nofCi:’* ’ .lX:' onT
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<
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2The Demonetization of Silver
J
I
Gold now came hack into circulation and an adequate *
supply of the metal was assured hy the discovery of new gold '
I
deoosits in California and Australia. Silver, with the ex-
j
I
ception of subsidiary coins, disappeared from circulation i
and for all practical purposes gold became the monetary
i
standard.
During the Civil War gold payments were suspended
|
and we remained on a paper basis until 1879. A significant I
development in this period, however, was the discontinuance
|
by Congress in 1873 of the coinage of silver. This was in
line with the action talcen by other advanced nations. Ger-
many had definitely adopted the gold standard in 1871 and in
1873 S’rance discontinued the free coinage of silver. The
Latin Ivlonetary Union, which had been organized on a bimetal-
lic basis, was unsuccessful and was definitely brought to
an end in 1878.
Congress demonetized silver as part of a general
revision of the coinage laws. "This aroused no interest at
the time,” says Holdsworth, "for under the ratio of 16 to 1
established in 1834 the silver dollar had become practically i
I
obsolete. In 1872 the silver bullion needed to coin a dollar
||
was worth fl.02, so nobody thought of bringing it to the mint j
to be coined. Silver dollars, of which only about eight
I
millions had been coined in the whole period since 178^, had
not been in circulation for more than a generation." ^
1. J. T. Holdsworth, Honey and Banking (5th ed.), p. 35.
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3The Beginning of the Silver Movement
The demonetization of silver may have aroused little
or no interest at the time, but in the following year it came,
and continued for many years, to be the subject of vehement
political controversy. The discovery of large deposits of
silver in our western states resulted in a tremendous increase
of silver in the market with the result that the price of the
metal fell rapidly. ”In 1874, for the first time in a gener-
ation, the silver in a dollar,” Muzzey points out, ”was worth
more than the same weight of silver in a salad bowl or an
umbrella handle."^ The silver miner then came to realize that
by accepting silver at the mint the government could maintain
the price of his product. He began to investigate the cir-
cumstances surrounding the demonetization of silver in 1873
and came to view with suspicion the motives of Congress in
dropping the coinage of silver.
The silver miner found a ready ally in the western
farmer who for years had been the ardent champion of cheap
money. Having been unsuccessful in their efforts to bring
about an expansion of the currency through an additional issue
of greenbacks, the farmers joined forces with the silver
miners in their demand for the resumption of silver coinage as
a means of increasing the volume of the currency and of
raising prices.
1 . D. S. Muzzey, History of the American People (1932 ed. )
,
p. 444.
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4The Bland-Aliison and Sherman Acts
The price of silver continued to fall rapidly, and,
had the old iDimetallic standard Tilth the sixteen-to-one ratio
j
been in force, silver would have been brought in large quanti-
ties to the mint for coinage. At the time we were still on a
paper basis, but had gold been in circulation, G-resham’s law
under such circumstances would have undoubtedly operated to
drive it out. ±4.s it was, gold remained the monetary standard
in theory at least and specie payments were resumed in 1879.
It is for this reason that Kilborne refers to the Act of 1873
as "a blessing in disguise.”^
The Act of 1873 was no blessing in the eyes of the
silver miners and the farmers. They inipugned the motives of
Congress in passing the act and referred to the demonetization
of silver as "the Crime of ’73.” They set out to undo what
j
Congress had done and to bring about the resumption of silver
2
coinage at the old ratio of sixteen to one.
A bill providing for the free and unlimited coinage
of silver at the old ratio of sixteen to one with gold was in-
troduced into the House of Representatives by Richard P. Bland
of Lassouri in 1877. The bill was modified, however, in the
upper house through the efforts of Senator alii son of Iowa,
and, as finally passed in 1878 over the veto of President
Hayes, provided for the purchase by the government of not less
1 . R. B. Ivilborne
.
Principles of L'oney and Banking (3rd ed.T,
p. 177.
2* Muzzey, loc . cit .
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® V
"thail l/ivo million nor mor© than f*our million dollars worth of*
silver ner month and for the coinage of such silver into
silver dollars of 412.5 ^^rains. By this action, ”our gov-
ernment,” says Muzzey, ”T)lede:ed itself to take from the mine
owners at least $24,000,000 worth of silver every vear to
coin into ’dollars’ which were worth in 1878 less than 90
cents aniece.”^
But the Bland-Allison Act proved very disappointing
to the silver miners and the inflationists. Prices continued
downvfard and by 1889 the market value of the silver in a dolla
2had fallen to seventy-two cents. Debtors were disgruntled
and complained of a lack of money. The movement to ”do some-
thiny for silver” h«d srained considerable headway and was a
factor to be reckoned with.
r
In 1890 the time was ripe for the passage of another
silyer bill. The Republicans were having difficulty in muster
ing enough votes to pass the McKinley tariff. ’’Why not strike
a deal whereby the silyer crowd would vote for the tariff and
the tariff crowd vote for the silver purchase act?” This is
exactly what vms done, and so the silverites voted for the
tariff and the Republicans agreed to support a silver measure.
5
1. History of the American Peonle
,
op . cit
.
,
p. 445,
2. H. U. Faulkner, American Economic History (New York, 1927)
p. 502,
3. R. D, Kilborne, Principles of Money and Banking, op. cit.,
p. 179.
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The result was the passage in 1890 of the Sherman
Silver Purchase Act providing for the purchase by the Secretary
of the Treasury of 4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion each
month and the issue of Treasury notes with full legal tender
power in payment therefor. "The 54,000,000 ounces of silver
which Congress thus ordered the Treasury to buy annually," says
Adams, "was practically the entire output at the time of the
American mines. There was no more reason why the government
should be required by law to buy the entire output of the silve::'
miners than the entire wheat output of the farmers, and many
Eastern Republicans must have had some realization of the
danger entailed to our whole currency and financial system.
However, as one of the Massachusetts Republican representatives
said: ’all there is in this silver bill is pure politics,’"^
And that politics, as we have seen, had to do with the passage
of the tariff.
Repeal of the Sherman Act
The Sherman Act had not been in force long before
the country experienced one of the worst crises and periods of
industrial depression in our history. The crisis came in 1893,
and, like all other crises, was the result of a multiplicity of
causes. The failure of the great English banking house of
Baring Brothers in 1890 led to a large-scale liq.uidation of
foreign investments in America and the withdrawal of large
1. 1. T, Adams, History of the United States (New York, 1933),
Vol. IV, p. 12.
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7funds from the country. Our crop surpluses were followed by
shortages and we were confronted with unfavorable interna-
tional trade balances which necessitated the exportation of
gold. Business was in an unhealthy state of overexpansion and,
at the breaking point, the business cycle began one of its
periodic do\mward courses.
The whole situation was aggravated by the condition
of the currency. More silver v/as being injected into the cur-
rency than could readily be absorbed and the result was a
general loss of confidence in the ability of the Treasury to
maintain gold payments. The price of silver continued to de-
cline. thus causing a decrease in the value of the silver hold-
ings of the Treasury. Silver, in fact, threatened to drive
gold out of circulation. Under such circumstances, Cleveland
summoned Congress in special session in 1893, and, after con-
siderable difficulty, was finally successful in bringing about
the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act.
The Treasury’s Plight
The repeal of the Sherman Act did not remedy the
precarious position of the Treasury. C-reenbacke continued to
be presented in .large amounts for redemption in gold, and, sin(j|<
the law required their reissue after redemption, they were pre-}
sented over and over again. The drain on our gold reserves
reached a.larming proportions and twice in 1894 the Treasury
sold bonds for gold. This proved of little avail, however,
for no sooner had the Treasury acquired gold when it was called
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"Thus the process," says Forman, "resembled the working of an
'endless chain* An act of 1882 virtually required the
Treasury to maintain a gold reserve of igilOO ,000 ,000
,
hut, in
February, 1895, Cleveland found that the ^'reasury's gold re-
serve had dropped to ^41,000,000 and that it was declining at
the rate of i^2,000,000 per day*^ !
The gold reserve had to be replenished* The sale of
bonds had proved futile, and Cleveland finally hit upon the
expedient of calling upon the bankers for aid. In February,
1895, he summoned to the i?hite House Llr* J* ?. Morgan, the
most influential banker in the country* And, as a result of
Mr* Morgan's visit with the President, a group of bankers
known as the Morgan-Belrnont-Roths child syndicate agreed to
furnish the Treasury some 462,000,000 in gold in exchange for
United States government 4 per cent bonds* The bankers more-
over agreed to secure half of the gold from abroad and to do
all in their power to protect the gold reserves of the
Treasury* "A howl of rage went up from the country," writes
Adams, "and the President was accused of having sold the
country to V/all Street* There is no question, however, that
he was justified* The syndicate had done more than buy the
bonds* By their management of the gold market and foreign
1* S* E* Forman, Our Republic (Hew ^ork, 1929), p* 645*
2* H. U* Faulkner, iunerlcan Economic History
.
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9exchange they stopped
,
for a while, the ’endless chain,’ which
Congress had refused to stop. They made a loss on their own
business to keep gold from flowing to Europe, as called for by
the rate of exchange. They provided the government with
$15,000,000 more gold than they had agreed to,”^
Opinions may differ regarding the propriety of
I
Cleveland’s relations with the bankers, but the fact remains
that, as a result of his action, the gold reserves of the
Treasury were replenished and confidence was restored to such
I
I
I
an extent that when in January, 1396, another bond issue was
floated, it was several times oversubscribed by the public.
The Defeat of Silver
The coinage of silver became the leading issue in the
campaign of 1896, The Democrats incorporated into their plat-
form a plank calling for the free and unlimited coinage of
silver at the old ratio of sixteen to one and nominated for the
presidency that ’’silver-tongued” orator from the West, William
Jennings Bryan, who was destined to become a leading figure in
American public life for more than twenty years. Bryan won the
nomination as the result of a speech which he delivered from th|^
platform of the convention. In a passionate outburst of
oratory he delivered a scathing indictment of the gold standard
and of the financial East and called upon the debtor farmers of
the West to rise against their Eastern creditors. ”We are
1. J. T. Adams, History of the United States
,
op . cit .
,
Vol. IV,
pp. 49-50.
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fighting," he exclaimed, in the defense of our homes, our
families, and posterity ... We have petitioned, and our
petitions have been scorned; we have entreated, and our en-
treaties have been disregarded; we have begged, and they have
mocked when our calamity came. We beg no longer; we entreat
no more; we petition no more. We defy them ... Having be-
hind us the producing masses of this nation and the world,
supported by the commercial interests, the laboring interests,
and the toilers everywhere, v/e will answer their demand for a
gold standard by saying to them; You shall not press down
upon the brov; of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not
crucify mankind upon a cross of goldi”^ Such was Bryan’s
exhortation to the Democrats assembled in the Chicago con-
vention and such was the plea that won for him the Democratic
nomination for the presidency of the United States.
The Republicans nominated as their candidate
William B. McKinley who had served for many years in Congress
and who had voted for both the Bland-Allison Act in 1878 and
the Sherman Silver Purchase Act in 1890. McKinley v/as known
as a "free silver" man, and it was with some difficulty that
he was finally persuaded to accept the Republican plank call-
ing unecLuivocally for the gold standard as the basis of the
country's monetary system. As a concession to the silverites
the Republicans did agree to further the cause of internationa
bimetallism, but clung to their advocacy of gold as the only
L
1. Quoted from Bryan's speech the text of which may be found
in D. S. Muzzey' s Readings in American History (New York,
pp, 542-5.
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soimd monetary standard in the absence of an international
agreement on silver.
The decline in the value of silver had been greatly
accelerated by India’s suspension of free silver coinage in
1893. In the following year the market value of the silver in
a silver dollar dropped below fifty cents and was. only slightly
in excess of the half-dollar mark when the Democrats in 1396
demanded the resumption of unlimited silver coinage at the old
ratio of sixteen ounces of silver to one of gold. ”As six-
teen ounces of silver,” says Muzzey, "were v/orth in the open
market only about $11 in 1896, while one ounce of gold was
uniformly and universally worth $20.67, the silverites were
therefore demanding that our government should maintain in
circulation ’dollars’ that were worth intrinsically only a
little more than fifty cents. The Democrats were chided on
the fact that they were advocating a fifty-cent dollar, but
replied that the United States was big and independent enough
to have any kind of dollar it wanted.
Bryan conducted a whirlwind campaign, travelling
the length and breadth of the land and making speeches that
were heard by millions of people. He maintained that the gold
supply was inadequate for meeting the currency needs of the
country and that it should be supplemented with silver. More-
over, the price of gold, he said, was manipulated by the
bankers who^ sought to control the supply of money and to ex-
1. D. S. Muzzey, History of the American People
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ercise over the economic life of the nation all of the domi-
nance that v/ent with that control. Bryan claimed to speak in
the interests of the toiling masses of the country -of the
farmer, the merchant, the country lawyer, the miner- whose
interests, he said, lay in an increasing supply of money and in
breaking the financial dictatorship of the bankers of Wall
Street
.
The campaign was bitterly fought and both sides
spent large sums of money in an effort to win the election.
The country was flooded with a mass of literature. The Dem-
ocrats, in particular, gave wide circulation to a publication
known as Coin’ s Financial School . written by Vifilliam H. Harvey,
in which the leading exponents of the gold standard were de-
nicted as being confounded by the simple questions and in-
struction of a boy teacher. "Public interest," says Dewey,
"had never been so aroused over a financial question since
Jackson’s war on the bank. For a short time business almost
came to a standstill because financial and commercial interests
felt that the possible adoption of free coinage would make
revolutionary changes in prices and contracts."^
The election resulted in a victory for the Republic-
ans, and, although the Populists had tried to scare the people
of the country by talking about the secession of the West from
the Union and of a possible appeal to arms in the event of a
1. D. R. Dewey, Financial History of the United States (9th
ed. )
,
p. 462.
‘i*;,
• ^
-v' 1
-toi or<t to ilB poiJflfl sr'#
-t': 9->:VaI-ron''C9 c.-'j Tflvc (.p-ois’
Hi :lBeqB o? ne..Ti,^io ri^y*:- . 'r.i,tnoo Je:!,? d:tfw soft^sfr
sri.t I’o- x'^jiujoo .-^lU 8»asi^;-T r'r^i.i: ,'c.t sr'd’ 'Jc •jtno're-tr.; cn^
93C - ~'X€'ni-ii e>'‘'d , 'iiiva'.Hil X'T ^tiifco o:i^
,
* i .'1
tii -^09 Tianon to ?‘r • ne nl ’/bI -ol- "tr'io.tnl
XI/.<u *>0 er‘^-:^r.ed cr/ri' 'ro^aroIS IjClo/r::/i !'*: •'‘.r ^ yl-n'^d
.wC'6'!^r.
c^'Oie fi^od v id f!/?w nr^U- ^rj^n &,, j
'•1
'
.i4.jit09le 9ii-t Li^vi o& d'lcJ'lo na nl ^onon Jo ci^'ua irer»
-x.oC ai£T .a'TJuiB’XsJi:! 10 ar.^ar ti iii i?; Oaijcoll saw ^*rcl
:ici;f£oi Icfi;q s Oo colualuciio eniw evjt?;
,
•i<3lx/o,ic<‘!.'9(j ‘
^
)aioo
fV^vzBd . i r/zlxlJo xd n.e^ii r£V « Icoitoc: • e ^rrioG 3£ rrwoi.f-';
-*ol) 6*:?j-i6np.t£: s/ld lo ^idjTfiiM'crx? nnidrel edo rfoi/:-/ ni
-ni t’lUfi eiT' icfaf/jjp 9i<^i£ od i fi- liico ^-xiiod bb 5a:Joig
ev^ri ci/.difS yod b Jo not^iouz^^r.
| ooLiz :rr'ivta&;.fp Xb i '^. ' 1 s tovo hrsi^czs oc naad 'ir?vaii
^aorT-Ift pr.efiiaird sxrrii c^To^^a s lo'? ^rf? nc tot p *
,
’ inlozersiCiO bBo T.‘?j. uzbbj'i ob-- oof^d XI; dsJStrod: <;. o? bc
’zu^x ft riT-T a,terries oeTl neio-ejofte ©X'Ji':- o-.i j-ti i'Isl '
ftfTf. ar^'ri^fq; /ii er-ViLOdO \ :,
. /'-'I
t-'T v- it!/ r : uev^Xi/ra^r .oivtoala ariT
9X^*^:o<X • rd bo'T.^
-<
rro-'l daoS o.;:r "r e £i'jf?sQQ'0Cfe e tt f'JcdB j;rj>'J..:i yd \'':o'’ii.eoc< o/id lo
f: 'h- V : T' EiTT.
I
le^'T' K 3 lo i'liB ncd(i!’ e-i.j .
jidOj *. -
'v/ vJ . i ' ; '. d -S-To.*'. ':Ii Ix.ioxie^ii''' ,ya7rv'l , . " ,1'
• - - •
^
13
Republican victory, such fears proved absolutely groundless.
The election was beyond doubt the most important since the
Civil Vfar. It marked the end for many years to come of or-
ganized political efforts on the part of the debtor classes of
the country to commit the government at V/ashington to the un-
sound policy of currency inflation either through the issue of
G-reenbacks or the free coinage of silver. Not until the great
depression years of 1930-34 were these issues again thrust in-
to the arena of politics.
The G-old Standard
The discovery of large gold deposits in the Yukon
valley and elsewhere shortly after the election of 1896 put
to rest any fears regarding the adequacy of the future supply
of monetary gold. We were, after the war with Spain, on the
brink of a period of business expansion and prosperity un-
paralleled in our history. An increasing supply of money and
growing optimism for the future placed the silver issue far
in the background.
The Republicans, however, did not carry out immedi-
ately their pledges on the money question. Silver sentiment
continued strong in the Senate, and it was thought politically
expedient to turn the country's attention from the money ques-
tion to the tariff.
In 1900 the time was ripe for the enactment of new
monetary legislation. The Currency Act of Larch 14th, commonly
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referred to as the Gold Standard Act,^ contained in the main
three important provisions:
First: It declared that the standard unit of value
should be the dollar consisting of 25.8 grains of gold nine-
tenths fine and that ’’all forms of money issued or coined by
the United States shall be maintained at a parity of value
with this standard.”
Second: It established a gold fund of $150,000,000
for the redemption of the Greenbacks and the Treasury Notes of
1890 and authorized the sale of gold bonds by the Secretary of
the Treasury to replenish this fund should it fall belov?
$100 , 000 , 000 .
Third: It authorized national banks to issue notes
up to the full par value of the bonds by which such notes were
2
secured but not in excess of the capital stock of the issuing
bank. The act also changed the capital req.uirements for na-
tional banks.
Since the United States had legally established the
3
gold standard in 1873, the Currency Act of 1900 was simply a
reaffirmation of the earlier enactment. It proclaimed clearly
1. The text of this act, as well as the text of all other acts
hereinbefore cited, may be found in the appendix of A. Barton
Hepburn ’ s History of Coinage and Currency in the United States
(New York, 1903)
,
pp. 436-583.
2. Under the original National Bank Act the amount of notes
vms limited to 90 per cent of the par value of the bonds by
which they were secured,
3. It will be recalled, however, that specie payments had been
abandoned during the Civil War and were not resumed until
January 1, 1879.
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and definitively that henceforth gold should be the standard
of value. By such action our government adopted a course
that had already been taken by the other leading commercial
nations. Thus, at the turn of the century, we had set our
monetary system in order and were to enjoy for several years
to come a period singularly free from radical assaults upon
the currency.
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CHAPTER II
A LOST OPPORTUNITY
The Financial Situation
The prosperity which followed the passage of the Cold
Standard Act was interrupted temporarily hy the panic of 1907.
The monetary phase of the crisis was the result in large meas-
ure of an inelastic system of hond-se cured currency and bank
credit. The national banks could issue notes only on the se-
curity of government bonds, and, although the Act of 1900 had
increased the amount of notes that might be issued from 90 to
100 per cent of the par value of such bonds, the national bank
note circulation proved inadequate for meeting the currency
needs of the country. \Vhen, in a time of expanding business,
an increase in the volume of circulating media was required,
the banks found that the price of government bonds, like other
prices, was high, thus making the further purchase of such
bonds unattractive from an investment standpoint. The ex-
pansive capacity of national bank note currency, then, was
limited to the capacity of the banks to purchase government
bonds. Moreover, it was somietimies found that the maintenance
of high reserves^ militated not only against the further pur-
chase of bonds but even against the extension of needed credit
to business.
1* The reserve requirements for national banks were 25^b against
deposits for banks located in central reserve cities (New York,
Chicago, and St. nouis); for banks in reserve cities (47
such cities in 1913); and 15% for country banks. Against notes
natl onjal. banks maintained a 5% reserve with the U. S • -Treasury*
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The collapse of 1907 focused the attention of the
country on the weaknesses in the banking and currency structure.
Congress appointed a special coramission to make an extended
study of the situation and to recommend such changes in banking
and the currency as would enable the financial mechanism to
fulfill adeq.uately the currency and credit needs of an ever-
expanding volume of business. The direct result of this in-
vestigation was the passage by Congress in 1913 of the Federal
Reserve Act which was beyond doubt the most important financial
measure since the Civil V/ar, The Federal Reserve System, which
the act created, provided the country with an elastic system of
currency and credit through the rediscount of commercial paper
and the issue of a new kind of currency known as the Federal
Reserve note. These notes were in time to become the largest
single item in our monetary circulation. The act also provided
for a lowering of bank reserves and for the use of such reserves
in time of emergency.
The "Limping" Standard
While these momentous changes were being made, little
was heard from the silverites. The last of the silver authorize
by the Sherman Silver Purchase Act was coined in 1905, and,
since that time, no new silver was coined. In 1905 our stock of
silver dollars amounted to $568,229,000^ and this figure remain-
ed practically unchanged until the year 1918. The standard
d
1. From Table No. 209, entitled "Stock of Money in the United
States, by Kinds," Statistical Abstract of the United States,
(Washington, 1933), p. 218.
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silver dollar enjoyed full legal tender power for all payments
both public and private. It was, however, standard money in
name only, for its commodity value v^as much less than its coin-
age value. The market value of the bullion in a silver dollar
fluctuated in accordance with the usual market conditions of
supply and demand. The extent of these fluctuations is shov/n
in the following table:
TABLE I
BULLION VALUE OF THE SILVER DOLLAR^
(in dollars)
Value of Value of
Year Silver in Dollar Year Silver in Dollar
TUUU 7^ TUTU .418
1901 .461 1911 .417
1902 .408 1912 .475
1903 .420 1913 .468
1904 .448 1914 .428
1905 .472 1915 .401
1906 .524 1916 .531
1907 .512 1917 .692
1908 .414 1918 .761
1909 .402
1. From Table No. 691, entitled "Silver
and Value of Silver in the Dollar,” Statistical Ab -
stract of the United States
,
op . cit
.
,
p. 673.
The silver dollar, then, was worth about fifty cents,
sometimes more and sometimes less, but, since the Treasury by
the Act of 1900 was req.uired to maintain all forms of money at
a parity with gold, it was generally understood that silver
dollars would be redeemed in gold if necessary to maintain that
parity. The silver dollar "limped” along vrith the gold, and,
because of the fact that it had full legal tender power but yet
was not freely coined, it came to be knovm as the "limping”
standard.
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The Silver Hoard
*Vhafc to do with our vast stock of silver dollars is
a question which has "been discussed at various times "by econo-
mists. The war years brought an increase in the circulation of
silver dollars, bringing it up to 79.0 millions^ in 1919, but ii
normal times the circulation is much below that figure. Since
the silver dollar is heavy and cumbersome, most people prefer
the more convenient paper money. In the West, where silver is
a local product, the silver dollar is in demand. There people
have a preference for the heavy metal over other kinds of money.
But the bulk of the silver dollars never got into circulation;
they have been piled up in the vaults of the Treasury. There
they form a mass of idle silver which must be counted and in-
ventoried periodically and which is otherwise expensive to the
2
government to maintain. Silver dollars serve as backing for
silver certificates, but, as Professor Seager once said, "they
contribute nothing to the acceptability of these certificates.”*
Prior to 19S3 silver certificates circulated because of a gen-
eral understanding that the Treasury would redeem them in gold
i
if necessary to maintain them at a par with other kinds of
j
1 money and because they filled a need for bills of low denom-
ination. There were few, except in the West, who ever thought
or wanted to turn them in in exchange for the silver dollar.
1
1. Table Ho. E18 "Lloney in Circulation, By Kinds," Statistical
Abstract of the United States, op. cit., p. S17.
2. J. T. Holdsworth, Money and Banking, op. cit., p. 78.
3. H. R. Seager, Principles of Economics (2nd ed.), pp. 338-9.
l
1

Various plans have been suggested from time to
time for disposing of our huge stock of silver dollars.^
One such suggestion calls for the cancellation of silver
certificates as they come into the Treasury and for the
conversion of an equal amount of silver dollars into
bullion and the sale of such bullion in the market* In
order to provide a substitute for the certificates thus
cancelled and to prevent any contraction of the currency,
the volume of United States notes might be Increased and
the proceeds from the sale of silver bullion used to in-
crease the Treasury's gold reserve for the redemption of
all forms of money outstanding* This plan, in fact, has
been definitely proposed by Professor Seager in the
interests of a ’’simpler" and "more rational" monetary
2
system*"' Of course, it might not be necessary to dispose
of our entire stock of silver dollars; a portion could be
kept for use as subsidiary coin* It might be objected
that the disposition of our huge silver stocks would
disrupt the market, but, if the bullion were fed on the
market gradually, it doubtless could be accomplished in
an orderly manner*
1* For a discussion of some of these plans see Holdsworth,
op * cit «
,
pp* 78-9, or Seager, op. cit *
,
pp. 339-340*
2. 0£* cit .
,
p* 340.
3* Holdsworth, op* cit.
, p. 79*

A War-time Situation
The exigencies o± the World War produced a
sudden change in the status ot silver. India's increased
sales to the Allies resulted in an expansion o± her in-
terior trade and in added demands upon the media oi payment.
At the same time the natives lost coniidence in India’s
currency and began to present the paper notes lor redemption
in silver rupees. These two forces precipitated a serious
crisis in India. The need for silver became acute and
the government first turned to China for help. China at
that time had an abundant supply of the white metal. Soon,
however, India exhausted her resources in this direction,
and, in final desperation, her government through Great
Britain appealed to the government of the United States
for aid. It so happenea that the only available supply
of silver was in the United States. A stock of millions
of silver dollars lay idle in the American Treasury. More-
over, we ourselves were experiencing an adverse trade
balance with India and were confronted with the possibility
of shipping large consignments of gold to satisfy that
balance.
Here, then, was an emergency situation created
by the exigencies of the war. In order to enable our
government to supply Great Britain with the necessary
silver with which to support the Indian currency and to
meet in silver our own adverse trade balances with India,
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a bill was introduced into the Senate on April 9, 1918,
known as 3. 4292 and entitled ”An act to conserve the gold
supply of the United States; to permit the settlement in
silver of trade balances adverse to the United States; to
provide silver for subsidiary coinage and for commercial
use; to assist foreign governments at war with the enemies
of the United States; and for the above purposes to
stabilize the price and encourage the production of silver."
In explaining the nature and purposes of the
bill to the House, Mr. Glass, chairman of the Committee on
Banking and Currency, spoke in part as follows;
"In our trade relations with the Orient, and
particularly with India, we are put with the
necessity of paying our balances in metal, and, on
account of the large importations of jute, burlap,
and other materials used in the handling and dis-
tribution of our crops, we are obliged to meet a
large exchange balance, to our very great disadvan-
tage. It shall be necessary for this country to
ship to India, fcr the next ensuing 16 months at
least, about $100,0C0 ,lC 0 of gold to meet our im-
portations, or otherwise to do what this bill
proposes to do, borrow from the Treasury the only
available stock of silver in the world at this
time and ship it to India to meet our trade
balances. It is not necessary to say to the House
that, gold being our primary money, every dollar
of it that we shall export circumscribes our
ability to meet the extraordinary commercial re-
quirements of our own country at this time.
"In short, if we do not pass this bill
immediately we may be put to the necessity of
shipping gold rather than silver to India ....
The bill provides that there shall be a retirement,
gradual or immediate, as circumstances may require,
of |350, 000,000 of outstanding silver certificates;
and as those silver certificates are retired a like
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I :
amount of silver coin in the Treasury held as
jj
a cover for the silver certificates will be
||
broker up and melted into silver bullion and sold |i
by the Secretary of the Treasury to meet foreign !
exchange exigencies and to avert serious trouble
in India. The Congress knows that India uses not
exclusively, but almost exclusively, silver as
its metallic currency. Any deficiency, if any,
in the circulating medium that may be occasioned
by the eradual or speedy retirement of |250,000,000
of silver certificates is to be met by the issuance,
jj
under authority of the Secretary of the Treasury ij
and the i'ederal Beserve Board, of what is known !
as Federal reserve bank notes, based on short-time
gold certificates and notes of the United States.
!
"When the emergency shall have passed or the 1
war ended, the Secretary of the Treasury is '
authorized to purchase an equivalent amount of
j
silver to that which may be utilized in this
j
transaction to replace the silver thus loaned to
1
the British Government and used for foreign ex-
I
change purposes by the recoinege of a like amount i
of silver dollars, upon which may be issued a like
|
amount of silver certif icates."!
|
I
Mr, Glass subsequently explained that {100,000,000
j
I
of silver was to be used to meet our accounts with India
i
I
and the other {250,000,000 "to meet foreign exchange
|
accounts with other countries and especially is to be used
to counter an exigency that vitally affects our allies in
the conduct of this war. Just in the degree that it
i'
vitally affects them," he added, "it affects us.”^ 11
J
Both President Wilson and Secretary McAdoo wrote |j
'I
ji
to Mr. Glass urging passage of the bill as "a genuine war !
emergency."^ The act was passed and was signed by the President
1. Oongressional Record
,
65th Gong. 2nd Sess., Vol.56, Part 6,
Apr. 22, l9l^?, pgs. 5422-2.
2. Ibid., p. 5422.
2. Ibid.
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on April 23, 1918*
An Act and an Opportunity
The Pittman Act, as this measure was called, pro-
1
vided for four things. First, it provided for the breaking
up and melting into bullion of 350,000,000 silver dollars
and for the sale of such bullion "at such prices not less
than |1 per ounce of silver 1000 fine and upon such terms
as shall be established from time to time by the Secretary
2
of the Treasury." The silver certificates for which silver
dollars so broken up and melted into bullion served as
backing were to be retired. Second, the Secretary of the
Treasury was authorized to replace such sales of silver
bullion by purchases from the product of United States mines
of silver "at the fixed price of ^1 per ounce of silver
3
1000 fine." Third, in oraer to prevent any contraction of
the currency from the retirement of silver certificates,
the issue of Federal Keserve bank notes on the security of
United States certificates of Indebtedness or one-year gold
notes was authorized. Fourth, these Federal Reserve notes
were to be retired as soon as the emergency had passed and
the domestic silver authorized by the act had been purchased
and coined.
1. The text of the Pittman Act appears in the Congressional
Record
, op . clt .
.
pgs. 5431-2.
2. Sec. 2
3
.
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Thus the government undertook to sell at one
dollar an ounce silver which it had bought at prices
ranging from fifty to sixty cents an ounce. Here v/as an
excellent opportunity to get rid of our idle hoard of
silver dollars. And that opportunity was recognized at
the time, for Mr. Platt spoke in the House as follows:
“This silver that is piled up in the
Treasury back of the silver certificates is
not real basic money. It is about 20 per cent
water, or fiat money, or v/hatever you have a
mind to call it. The silver certificates
circulate on a gold basis by fiat of law ...
It is a good thing to be able to get rid of
the silver, and get rid of it at a good
price
“Now, the proposition that we have got to
buy it back again and pile it up all over again
is vicious and v/rong ...
“This is a Senate bill and we are told to
pass it just as it came from the Senate. It is
a plain case of holdup by the silverites, and
I expect to do what I can, when the present
emergency has passed, to see that the objectionable
features shall be repealed.!
The v/ork of the Silverites
The extraordinary demand for silver created by the
war may have afforded an excellent opportunity of disposing
of our hoard of idle silver dollars, but such was farthest
from the thoughts of the silver leaders in Congress. They
at first regarded the whole affair with suspicion, but,
when they saw in the Pittman proposal an opportunity of
1. Congressional Record , or . eft., pg. 5435
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stabilizing the price of silver and of stimulating the pro-
duction of the white metal, they became ardent advocates
of the measure. In fact, the Pittman bill had been drawn
up only after consultation between representatives of the
Treasury and representatives of the mining Interests.
Senator Pittman himself had met with representatives of
the miners and had discussed the bill with them. He re-
ported to the Senate that he knew the views of the silver
producers and also the sentiment of the West and that he
’’would rather have the fixed price of |1 . an ounce for
silver than to have the price of ;^1.15 one week and 85 cents
1
the next.” In fact, the senator admitted on the floor
of the Senate that the mine producers ”demanded” that the
2
price should be a dollar.
”7/hen the Government fixes a definite price of
silver,” said Senator Owen in speaking for the measure,
’’the miners can m.ake their plans accordingly, and seeing
for several years ahead a fixed market at |1 an ounce, it
will stimulate the production of silver in this country
and replace the idle silver which is now in the Treasury
3
merely in storage.”
Thus the silver forces were strong enough to
commit the government to the repurchase from American miners
1. Congressional Record
,
65th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 56,
Part 5, April l6, l5l8, p. 5249.
2. Ibid .
— 3. - Ibid ., p. 5242.
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of silver at per ounce in an amount equivalent to that
broken up and melted into bullion to meet the demands
created by the waro The silver dollars so melted down
slightly exceeded 270 millions.^ The Treasury purchased
silver, as required by the Pittman Act, from May, 1920,
to June, 1923." The price paid for the metal was $1 per
ounce, although the market price of silver during this
period was below 70 cents most of the time. ’’The re-
coinage of silver dollars,” records Ely, "began in 1921
and continued until April, 1928, *when all of the silver
dollars melted had been recoined**"^
There was no need for the repurchase and re-
coinage into dollars of this silver. Instead of being
governed by purely monetary considerations and taking
advantage of the opportunity of ridding the currency of
the idle silver dollar. Congress was actuated by con-
siderations of political expediency. The conclusion
reached by Kilborne is:
"The repurchase of this silver was but a
subsidy to the silver mine owners. As long as
the price of silver was above $1 an ounce, sil-
ver was sold to those who would pay more for
it. As soon as the price of silver dropped to
loss than $1 an ounce, the silver miners sold
1. F. R. Fairchild, F. S. Furniss, and N. S. Buck, Elementary
Economics (New York, 1926), Vol. I, p. 400.
2o R. T. Ely, Outlines of Economies (5th ed., 1932), p. 248.
3. Ibid .
4. Ibid.
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the silver to the government. Instead of taking
advantage of the situation to improve our monetary
system -a situation which may not occur again-
Congress under pressure of a war measure allowed
this defect to continue*
1* Kilhorne, op. cit
. ,
p. 186
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7CHAPTER III
THE 3ILVEHITES’ UB.V DEl-iAND
A imatter oi Political Expediency
The currency system ought to he constructed and
I regulated with reierence to the monetary needs oi the country.
Such, however, has not been the case, lor we have seen how
> on several occasions in our history the silver lorces have
been sulliciently strong in Congress to secure the enactment
ol legislation designed to place their prouuct in a pre-
lerred class. Such legislation, Irom the Bland-Allison
Act on, has aimed at increasing or maintaining the price ol
,
silver and at the encouragement ol its lurther production.
Prom a strict monetary standpoint the injection ol silver
into the currency, except lor use as subsidiary coin, has
' been unnecessary. In lact, it has done positive harm, lor
! on one occasion at least it was directly responsible lor a
i
! major linancial crisis with serious impairment to the credit
I 1
ol the government. I^oreover, our currency system, being
' the outgrowth ol evolution and political whim rather than
ol conscious planning and adjustment, has become needlessly
complex, ana the presence ol silver in the currency has
j
added to that complexity. Our vast acquisitions ol silver
have been stored in the vaults ol the Treasury where they
remain an idle and unused store ol wealth.
1. Relerence is here made to the lin* ncial crisis in Cleveland
’
s
second administration. See supra, pp. V-fa.
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Attempts to increase the circulation of the
silver dollar have failed. The so-called "Peace Pollars,"
issued after the War, were mere curiosities ^ich soon
disappeared from circulation, ^ter the War the Treasury
made a definite attempt to put the silver dollar into
circulation. Almost as soon as the silver authorized "by
the Pittman Act had been repurchased and coined into
dollars, the Secretary of the Treasury made a plea to
the American Bankers' Association in behalf of a wider
circulation for the silver dollar. But despite this
plea and the reported practice on the part of certain
Treasury officials to always use silver dollars with
which to pay for their lunches, the silver dollar just
would not circulate.^ The silver dollars constantly
found their way back to the Treasury as people preferred
the more convenient paper money. It was impossible to
keep the "cartwheels," as the heavy silver dollars were
called, in circulation and finally the Treasury admitted
the defeat of its efforts.^
Silver dollars serve as backing for silver cer-
tificates. Silver certificates, however, have constituted
but a relatively small item in our total monetary circula-
tion and are, at best, an inelastic form of currency. Be-
fore 1933 they circulated at par only because of the gen-
1. Kilborne, 0£. cit .
,
p. 186.
2. The Ifew York Times
.
Hay 2, 1925, p. 19.
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eral understanding that the Treasury would redeem them in
gold if necessary* As pointed out above, wise counsel dic-
tates their ultimate retirement and replacement by United
States notes, ^ or possibly Federal Reserve notes.
The non-monetary character of our silver legisla-
tion is obvious. The entire series of enactments has been
inspired not by considerations based on monetary needs, but
by considerations of politicsuL expediency.
The V/orld Situation
The war created an enormous demand for silver
with a consequent rise in the price of the metal. The
price broke sharply in 19E1, to be sure, but it nevertheless
remained fairly high. Moreover, during the early post-war
years, the silver purchases of the American G-overnment
under the provisions of the Pittman Act tended to bolster
the price of the metal and to postpone the decline which
might otherwise have occurred. The prevailing level of
high prices created an almost unparalleled situation.
Many nations found that the bullion value of the silver
in their silver coins was considerably in excess of the
nominal gold value of those sanie coins. A reduction in
the silver content of such coins became, therefore, not
only profitable but a matter of practical necessity if
silver was to remain in circulation. Consequently, these
1. See supra
, p. 20.
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nations, including Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Holland,
Germany, Brazil, and Greece, resorted to the practice of
reducing the pure silver content of their coins. ^ "Great
Britain, for example, reduced the pure silver content of
her fractional money from 925 parts of silver in 1000 to
500 parts in 1000, the balance being copper." 2 By so de-
basing their silver coins these nations were able not
only to effect great economies in the use of silver, but,
in addition, to dispose of their surplus silver in a
good market.
Silver coinage received an added setback in the
practice of many nations of substituting paper money and
coins of less expensive metal for silver. In recent years
paper notes have been substituted for silver coins of
large denomination while those of lower denomination have
been replaced by coins of nickel, bronze, and copper.
Especially has this been true of such countries as India,
Germany, France, the Philippines, and many others, where
silver coins in the higher denominations have been largely
replaced by paper notes. ^ Not only have paper notes, being
more convenient, gained in popularity, but it has been
found that substantial savings have accrued from the use
of coins of the less expensive metals.
1. E. W. Kemmerer, Kemraerer on Money (Philadelphia, 1934),
p. 121.
2 . Ibidem
3. Ibid., p. 120.

The Situation in India
Another important development in the silver
situation occurred in 1926 when the government of India
decided to adopt a gold bullion standard. India since
1899 had been on the gold exchange standard. Her currency
consisted on the silver rupee, v/hich enjoyed full legal
tender power; subsidiary coins of silver, nickel, and
bronze; and paper in the form of government notes.^
The note circulation was backed to the extent of more
than one-half by a reserve of gold and silver, and the
balance largely by government securities, some of
which were held in England and some in India, and to a
limited extent by trade bills. The issue of notes on
the basis of trade bills served as a margin for seasonal
expansion. The rupee was given a parity of 16 d. and
the government up to the time of the V/orld War had been
able to maintain the rupee at its exchange value. But
the War, as mentioned above, placed a tremendous strain
upon the Indian currency.^ The situation became so
serious that India was confronted either with the
necessity of declaring her paper notes inconvertible
or of purchasing silver in large quantities for coinage
purposes. The only available stock of silver at the
1. A good description of the currency system as v;ell as
an account of recent monetary developments in India is
given in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th. ed., 1929),
Vol. 12, pp. 172-3.
2. See supra, p. 21.
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time was in the vaults of the United States Treasury
and under the provisions of the Pittman Act some 270
million dollars worth of this silver was shipped to
India. ^ The importation of silver from the United States
however, failed to settle India's difficulties. The
price continued to rise, and, when it reached 43 d. per
ounce, the bullion value of the silver rupee came to
exceed its coinage value. It became profitable at this
point to melt down the silver rupee and to hold the
silver for shipment abroad as bullion. Under such con-
ditions the Indian government was finally forced to
raise the parity of the rupee.
After the War the problem of the Indian
currency was referred to a commission of experts whose
recommendations resulted in the passage of the Indian
Coinage Act of 1920. By this act the rupee was linked
to gold rather than to sterling, as had formerly been
the case, and was given a value equivalent to one-tenth
of a gold pound. Adverse trade balances made it im-
possible for India to maintain the rupee at this new
parity. A new currency problem ensued and was the
subject of study by the Indian Royal Commission
appointed in August, 1925. This commission reported on
1. See supra
. p. 27.
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August 6, 1926 and recommended the adoption of the gold
bullion standard v/ith the value of the rupee fixed at
1 s. 6 d* The commission also recommended the creation
I
I
not later than January, 1929, of a Reserve bank which
!
was:
1) To keep the fluctuations of the rupee within
the gold points.
2) To be entrusted with the issue of notes.
3) To hold the reserves of the Bank of India.
4) To carry the accounts of the government.
5) To handle all overseas remittances of the
government
The Indian Grovernment delayed the establish-
^
ment of the Reserve bank, but adopted immediately the
recommendations of the commission regarding the
:
establishment of the gold bullion standard and has
succeeded in maintaining the rupee at its new
;
value. The commission pointed out that unduly large
silver reserves were out of olace in a gold standard
I
! system and recommended that India reduce her large
!
I
reserves of silver by feeding them gradually on the
!
I market over a period of years. The silver reserves
were to be reduced from some 850 million rupees to a
2
maximum of 250 million. The plan was to reduce the
,
1. Summarized from the account of the commission's recommen-
dations given in the World Almanac (Hew York, 1927), p. 579.
2. Gr. A. Smith, Jr., "Silver -Its Status and Outlook,"
Harvard Business Review
,
October, 1934, p. 45.
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silver reserves and to build up the gold reserves.
Effects on Silver
The effect of these developments was to
cause uncertainty in the silver market and to hasten
a decline in the price of the metal. India, traditionally
a great buyer of silver, suddenly turned seller. The
Indian government began its sales of silver in 1927, and,
while it has failed thus far to effect the desired re-
duction in its total holdings, its action nevertheless
constitutes a threat to the price of silver,^ India’s
vast silver stocks hang like a veritable ’’sword of
Damocles” over the silver market, for at any moment
should the government be successful in unloading itself
of its silver, the market would be completely disrupted.
The action of India and the practice on the
part of many nations since the war of debasing silver
coins and of selling large quantities of demonetized
silver in the world markets have been sources of grave
concern for the friends of silver. These developments
have all acted to cause a depressing influence on the
price of silver and to hasten the decline which began
in the late Twenties, Moreover, the friends of silver
have in recent years witnessed an increase in the popu-
larity of paper notes at the expense of silver coin,
TT A.S a matter of fact, India’s silver reserves have been
Increased because of a return flow of silver from the cir-
culation into the treasury. See Kemmerer, Op. Cih
,
p. 123.
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The cause of silver has indeed received many setbacks
and friends of the white metal have had good cause for
their profound disappointment.
The action taken by the Indian Government
has been severely criticized by leading silver economists.
Most of the savings of the common people of India are
in the form of hoarded silver, ana it has been maintained
that the siump in silver following the government’s
action has not only seriously impaired the value of those
savings but has destroyed the purchasing power of the
people. Moreover, the shift to the gold bullion
standard has placed an added strain on what, it is
maintained, is already an inadequate gold supply. One
eminent writer on the subject. Dr. Arendtz, has even
gone so far as to venture the opinion that the putting
of India on the gold bullion standard "will, in future
years, be looked upon as the premier financial and
economic blunder of the century.”!
The Depression
Then came the depression. It broke in the
United States with the stock market crash of October,
1929, but the effects of the world-wide collapse had
1. H. P. Arendtz, The Way Out of Depression (Boston, 1931)
pp. 34-5.
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been felt elsewhere long before that time. The countries
,
I
of Europe, in fact, had experienced hard times since I
the war. By the end of the Twenties the entire world
i
I
was in the throes of the deepest industrial depression ;i
||
since that which followed the Napoleonic Wars. li
I
i|
The causes of the debacle were numerous and I!
jj
complex--3o numerous and complex that they cannot be
reduced to a single explanation or even a series of
j
explanations. The situation was the outcome of many i
li
forces generated in large part by the conditions of -i
I’
the World War. As in past experiences, the depression ''
in its early stages caused a collapse in the price i
j
•
1
structure. The forces of deflation proved ruinous to
i
producers, and, among the producers affected, was the ij
jl
silver miner. The average price of silver which in 1921 i‘
was 63 cents per ounce had dropped to 53.3 cents in 1929 i!
and in 1930 went to 38.5 cents. ^ The situation was
Indeed disappointing to the silver forces who, as in
previous periods of falling prices, now turned to the
^
government for aid in rehabilitating the price of the ''
ii
metal. The old arguments for the coinage of silver,
||
II
so familiar to the student of monetary history, were ’!
i
1. From Table No. 691 entitled "Silver: Price, and. Value |
of Silver in the Dollar,” Statistical Abstract of the '
United States
, 1933, ££. cit . , p. .
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again resurrected and brought into the forum of public
discussion* To the silver champions the industrial de-
pression Was no perplexing phenomenon. They attributed
the cause of the collapse to the failure of the supply
of primary money to keep pace with increases in the
production of commodities* They again questioned the
motives of Congress in demonetizing silver in 1873 and
came to look upon those bankers and economists who
stood by the gold standard as the apostles of an out-
worn philosophy—a philosophy of greed and avarice
which perpetuated class distinctions and denied the
people 8 currency sufficiently plentiful to enable them
to pay off their debts* The silverites even went so
far as to maintain that the way out of the depression
lay in the remonetization of silver* Not since 1896
had the cause of silver gained such wide popularity
and not since then had the silver champions presented
to the American people so strong a case for the re-
monetization of silver*
f
CHAPTER IV
THE GOLD ARGUI:EKT
The Failure of Gold
The oase for silver is based fuDdamentally on
the contention that the world is suffering from a lack of
purchasing power* It is estimated that the production of
goods and services increases at a rate of about three per
cent annually and that purchasing power roust increase in
corresponding ratio if price levels are to be maintained.
Since gold serves as the primary money and also as a
base for the expansion of credit, additional purchasing
power is dependent upon increases in the stock of monetary
gold. The silverite maintains that during the post-war
period the supply of monetary gold has failed to keep
pace with increases in production and that the resulting
shortage in purchasing power was responsible for the
rapid decline in prices which brought on the depression.
The shortage in the supply of monetary gold
has rendered the gold standard unworkable as a medium
for international exchange. Moreover, the difficulties
of the situation have been agerravated by the inequitable
distribution of existing monetary gold stocks. The re-
sult has been that some forty nations, being unable to
secure and retain sufficient supplies of monetary gold,
have been forced to abandon the gold standard. The
view of the silver leaders has been admirably presented
I
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by one of their number as follovvst
"ly^y contention is that the present world-
wide deplorable conditions are due to (1) the
failure of the gold mines of the world to pro-
duce enough money metal to supply the world ^s
monetary needs; and, secondly, and perhaps of
more importance than the first, is the mal-
distribution of the gold of the world, 70 per
cent of which is held by France and the United
States
.
"Today the leading commercial nations of
the world, with the exception of France and the
United States, find themselves where they are
unable to get and retain gold. It necessarily
has the effect of depreciating world comraodity
prices in terms of gold#....
"Every student of political economy should
realize by now that in order for the gold standard
to function nroperly in the world so that the
various countries can expand their currencies
and thereby expand their purchasing power
in the world markets, it is necessary for
them to have their proper share of the gold
reserve of the world. They do not have this
today. ”1
The silver leaders are convinced that the gold
standard has outlived its usefulness. They maintain
that it can never again function as an international
monetary mechanism because of the lack of available
supplies of m'^netary gold. Not only are existing gold
stocks woefully inadequcte for fulfilling our present
monetary needs, but the situation will become pro-
gressively more acute as the known sources of gold
1. Q,uoted from "l^hat is koney," an address delivered
over the radio by Senator Burton K. ^Yheeler, Feb. 14,
1933. The text appears in the appendix of the Gongres
sional Record
.
April 18, 1933, pp. 4537-8.
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become exhausted. The silver leaders argue that there
is little likelihood of the discovery of new gold de-
posits and that all the gold in the world is not now,
or ever will be, sufficient for meeting the world's
monetary requirements. The difficulties in the way of
expecting much further of gold have been stated suc-
cinctly as follows:
"There are only about IZ-^ billion dollars'
worth of monetary gold known to be in existence.
It is estimated that there is 3 times this
amount of currency outstanding resting on and
redeemable by this gold base. This is exclusive
of bonds, notes, contracts, and all other
obligations payable in gold, which amount to
many times this figure. It is generally admitted
that the monetary stock of gold is now, or will
in the reasonably near future, be insufficient
as a base for the world's monetary requirements.
This burden upon gold is accentuated by lack
of confidence in ability to redeem gold cur-
rencies and obligations and the knowledge of
the maldistribution of gold, and the require-
ments of the payment of international war
debts in gold, and incidentally hoarding of
gold by governments and individuals.
The world is suffering, and will continue to
suffer, from a lack of purchasing power. Up until the
last quarter of the 19th Century when the leading nations
of the world demonetized silver, silver had for hundreds
of years been used along with gold as primary money.
If the lost purchasing power of the world is to be re-
stored, the silver leaders maintain, the supply of
1. "Remonetization and Stabilization of Silver 7/ithout
Disturbing Cold Standard," statement by Eon. Key Pittman,
U. S. Senator from Kevada, before Committee on Coinage,
Wei^dits. and Measures of the House of Representatives, on
Reported in Congressional Record. Apr. 17.
e*ie.io levli o Sfil .
3i"o-. &vi
- .0 f 'io w-c-vcooifj oxiii 0:o i)ooiiXiC'ilJ:X ei'ioi- fc-^
,^^'on ^o:-: oi. X)X‘COvv ort^ :£i ;
X/a-. X..£: sJiaoc
a'Xi'xor? orl? ‘ic^ ^r.-..Xvit‘l:;;c: , -X
IIIv lo'-
vvxw axie 1:1 a^riiii;oi.Vir>
vtu^.AOa
-o/;e xio.>^ i>Xo3 lici!:!:
v^i^osq^xe
yrUcllc^T x:;. 7X;;o£iXo
no'X'XX -^Sl :^iJodr. L^o i?'iB
ii.' srf 0 # rrvo.'a 5Xoa -./x.-Jorto.:: 'io id^-ssw
t^lcii ^ si ^''ieria fcer^&xux^ax;
vi
6X1^ «o scxlBS. ; . .. ... :xx, -o
lasjo.;^
i.io^ ai.it e ictejieeXcT
.-'
'T if xx.O b , i ; t-‘v Oil , :Xn;oG :eo
ni eX: isvjiCi sn DI i'ji^iXG 0
3.1xlv ^
X-' c j a ’•'I’la u &n0 offi r^sx^'tJ.j.XW iy . -tOUi 13- ^ xfx*
•* r*’' i Gi , t^'T.ix'S ,V*iI '1j:;'©££ CfiSXlOai- '.’i..
axis iol ^
-
'
-o;:i. oi _.bXo^ rxoqx^ r^oX'xro ai::x.
-‘XL-'O XXO X h’OGXO'X 0^ -^^CiJX.Jii. Xyl OOiUy^'^ZaO--
^--J
'xo exit aru.;
a:;oit.-^£iXti o se-C;-r.e‘x
,, f- F, -f.
^X'j':« xC xoitxitl’i'X- axb.D'--
“''"".air.LaixIx;i:.a-xe'}::q'to eiiS lo i-i-a.i
'£0 isijxieorl v,XJje^:io5iO;:i: one . ' -'-oa £!X Svuui;
" X«
. ,- Xcxjiii .'iiinX i - -^ 3^Dr.'i^•-i^-':!a '4cf ;j^oa
oi s(;ui?:xoa Lllr . -a .ajxi-xel^ur: .:.i: IS.-to'^
sd'
sA' 'r' .dSBoc Sdisaiioiu? 'io
:5a,-il a ..;o'i- ,"-3
adiii-9X ner-B --diis-r. rtiei a.ii xo
aa^i
,u>9'i6.d.T. -£02 isvUb ,x»”Xio XfiiXisr.o- 5 SXio.t ^dl
io
.-.eaoffi as aXos XAoXx
ia d neso e-x-iav. 'xo
-.£1 VO' oJ sX EXdOB eat to -x. .:o3 a-dia^-ilodi-o
J?.oi sdr tl
c f-,..- ar<-* -•-?• e‘^cii-’’-??X 'ivvIX^’ iii:' ,_e-iot3£0 V.i.'-. ,••*- , ••. 0,, ' »•. -J..-. • VI -
1 6 j' .i~
(.
primary money roust be increased and, since there is
little hope of discovering new sources of monetary
gold, the most practical way of increasing the supply
of primary money is through the remonetization of
silver. Silver, they say, must once again be made
primary money. It must be restored to its former
position of honor in the world's monetary system and,
together with gold, serve in meeting the world's
monetary needs.
Those interested in the cause of silver
believe that an international agreement for the free
coinage of both gold and silver at a fixed ratio would
assure unto the world an adequate supply of metallic
money. Moreover, they want the United States to
assume the leadership in bringing about such an
international agreement. They argue that "we have
power at the present time, by reason of our economic
position in the world, to force the rest of the world
to adopt bimetallism."^ If Congress would take the
lead by passing a bill for the remonetization of
silver, other nations, it is argued, would soon
follow
.
1. Quoted from Senator Wheeler's speech on "What is
Money," Congressional Record
,
op . cit . , p. 4538.
ei ii' b li 'i Jw- V 'X L Cl -i f b v.- t'’!- I."[Q
V't ^. '.' s-OTuo-^ 7'rfi'Xt>"Ot:e c : j > *iq')i ?Xj.rH
v^ Ccqub 8>:: T4 ?i £8 tiontr a ,• “ a v^bv: IsolS'os'iq J'^on' ouf , 6J.0.5
*j • no L d’oao roi ie;d.t d;-o-0'iilj '; r i y/x '’-.nriq So
‘jbEr: bd i!i -^rscB ooao jBJj '
,
"..yo v.ed* ,'.«:'5vii ' .•xr**’Xi;3
li ’ToS stX oj oA'io^aa'i tid XiO"" Jl . •bioc:'i v.ii^o’X'rq
,
i. fi/i- -.n9.X: V '.: * -yriofn ' 0 1 o 0 '.v srf:; n £ tonod S o iotfteoq
s'^'Izov, ^dd :sn f^6w(r ox ^vo:ob , Ms cJc" looMsoj
.frf^ea vnaj^cioai
r^vlxa So eoL'-'c arid nf ^ adBaiasTn X f>ooriT
oro'S ed ; 'loS da?i.aao.".?. '• I eac-x J-saiad'iI j.sri.; evoilacf
bltfO'j’ Oxjrf’i be-yil n js 'lavI-CB 5q«i bXos ri.'ori So o'f:3aioc
f. .tXXii'ao So yXci'"’L''s ad^o’osbo Of- 6 Xtu‘^ OkiJ od'Oii otxtgsxi
od ^Dd. to catrn-J erit tofr.v Y 3 dt ,‘: -’roo'ic: . 'OO'i!
ao rictrs t.rrobx? 0: aidsx'joi^al erit ooirsos
av^ri a-’" tjbrit ao'S'tf? qariT . "noT3a''s - Xenot «;oa'i3t>i i.
ox OiOua 'tuo So .loe^iai Yd ,©'rit toaao'ia arft t3 isvvoq
Mo-o'- arit So tgso: orit acacoS o.' ,bXTO^ arit nx aoidisoq
,
erit eiXad fcl uo?/ 'll xiX:-^t8::-i bd tqoo3 ot
So aoxt 3 .'? i Tsno^a'x sat 'xo'l Hid 3 ^^ai'.esq y^c bo.aX
i.ioos blcow .tejjoi '. is r ?i ^^oHOltoa oarit'' ,'ravIXrt
.
' oi Xo i
gt tariV." ao ri'oaaq.a r
’
i;vl''='ar5
'
'lorooac 'JOyS rot: .- .l
A Case of Fraud?
The silver forces have made much of the
argument that silver should never have been demone-
tized in 1873. It is alleged that the Act of 1873
was one of the greatest pieces of fraud ever put
over on the American people. In proof of this
assertion a wealth of documentary material has been
produced tending to show that certain of the leaders
in Congress did not know that the Act of 1873 pro-
vided for the demonetization of the silver dollar.
It is asserted today, as it was shortly after the
passage of the Act of 1873, that the demonetization
of silver was the work of international bankers who
for their own pecuniary advantage were interested in
maintaining the single geld standard. The argument
even goes so far as to accuse the bankers of having
bribed the members of Congress and of having other-
wise used their influence to secure legislation
discontinuing the coinage of silver.
ViHiether there is any basis in fact for these
assertions will probably remain a matter of historical
debate. Nevertheless, the fact remains that silver
was undervalued at the mint and no silver dollars
had been coined for years. The act merely gave con-
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gressional recognition to an existing state of affairs
Theretofore there had been little or no interest in
the monetary possibilities of silver, but soon after
1873 when the price of silver dropped, the silver in-
terests came to realize that the acceptance of silver
by the mint at a fixed price would not only stem the
fall in, but actually maintain, the price of the metal
It was then that the silver leaders discovered that
silver had been demonetized by the Act of 1873 and it
was then that the movement to remonetize silver began*
The silver leaders looked with suspicion upon the
motives of the members of Congress In passing the
Act of 1873 and referred with considerable feeling to
the demonetization of silver as the *'Crime of '73.*'
They clamored for the repeal of the act and for the
remonetization of the white metal* And they did so
with the attitude of righting a wrong* Kilborne
writes;
"They claimed that the act was jammed
throu^, that it was done under cover and that
it was a political crime* Congressman Kelly,
for example, claimed that he did not know
that the Act omitted the coinage of the
silver dollar* Senator Stewart also claimed
that he was unaware that the Act of 1873
omitted the silver dollar* As a matter of
fact, the bill was pending in Congress for
three years, printed thirteen times, and
was the subject of considerable debate in
both houses* In view of the fact that
Congressman Kelly was chairman of the
House committee which had charge of the
bill and had stated that the bill had been
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studied line for line, it does seem almost
unreasonable to think that he did not
knovr that the bill omitted coinage of the
silver dollar." ^
The facts may have been otherwise, but it is
certain that many people today are convinced that the
demonetization of silver was the political job of
selfish banking and gold-standard interests. These
interests, it is believed, sought to deprive the
people of a supply of primary money sufficient to en-
able them to pay off their debts. And it is the same
1 interests, it s alleged, who today are opposing the
I
restoration of silver as primary money and who through
I
!
their manipulation of gold are largely responsible for
I
j
the present depression.
I
bid Gold Fail?
I
The silver leaders may argue that the v/orld
i
is suffering from a shortage in the supply of monetary
gold, but an examination of the figures regarding gold
i
production and monetary gold s tocks fails to support
that viev/. On the contrary the figures show that the
supply of monetary gold has not only not failed, but
has increased steadily and in recent years has attained
new high records. One of the most enlightening and
informative compilations of figures regarding the gold
1. Kilborne, op. cit.
,
p. 176

situation appears in the I.:onthly Letter^ of the National
City Bank of l^ew York for Farch, 1932. .All of the fibres
are taken from official sources. The table (which is re-
produced on the follomns: page) shows the value of the
mine output of gold for each year from 1912 to 1922 and
the yearly increase in monetary gold stocks for forty-
eight countries which make up practically the entire
commercial world. The bank concludes that "the annual
increase in gold stocks in the period 19CC-1929 was
5.8 per cent; period 1912-1929, 4.6 per cent; 1929-1922,
5 .C per cent. "2 Gold production dipped during the war
period and in 1922. ^he dip in produciion during the
war was "due to an increase of mining costs, which not
only made many low grade properties unprofitable, out
discouraged prospecting and new mining enterprises."^
In 1922 the low point in production was reached "when
a miners* strike affected an important reduction in the
Transvaal field. But, adds the Bank:
"Since that year the trend has been up-
ward
,
and with the decline of mining costs
since 192C the news from the mines has been
sensational, production rising from [402,000,
000 to ^^'494 ,000 ,000
,
according to the pre-
liminary estimate for 1922, or by approximate-
ly 22.5 per cent. Ihe highest previous rec-
ord was ;;470,000,0 00 in 1915.
1~.
-g. 42. Ibid .
1^: 5. lbi_d .
o , Ibid
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The preliminary estimate for 1932, used by the
Bank, proved to be correct* In 1932 world gold production
reached a new high figure.^ The rising value of gold
made new prospecting profitable and operation was resumed
on hitherto submarginal mines. The depression has given
a tremendous stimulus to gold mining*
The record set in 1932 has in turn been broken
by gold production in 1933 and 1934* In each year a new
record was established* A nows item in the New York
Times of February 25, 1935 records:
”World gold production in 1934 is es-
timated at 27,350,000 ounces, compared with
25,344,000 in 1933 and 24,330,000 in 1932*
For the third year in succession, therefore,
all records have been broken*”^
All of this new gold has not as yet been put
to monetary use* The tremendous Increase in gold pro-
duction is, however, of great significance, especially
in the face of a declining demand for non-monetary
gold* The supply of gold has not failed; it has
actually increased to new high records* Moreover, the
probability of discovering new sources of gold is not
so remote as the silver leaders believe* It has been
reported that the Rand field which produces one-half
of the world* s gold supply is probably more extensive
than has been supposed *3 New gold has been discovered
1* The Commercial & Financial Chronicle, Feb* 18, 1933.
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in Kenya and in other parts of Africa.^ Recently the
Belgian Congo, V/est Africa, Borneo, and the Philippine
Islands have assumed increased importance as producers
of gold. 2 Australia shows promising possibilities,^
while no one knows how much gold there may be in
Northern Russia and Siberia*^ Russia has forged ahead
rapidly as a producer and it has been said that gold
deposits of untold size lay within her borders.
The rising value of gold has caused the gold
mining industry to boom in Canada and the United States.
The prospect of profits has once again brought prospectors
on to the scene and has led to the opening of new mines
and the operation of old ones. Both countries have
recently established new highs in gold production.
Vyhat a Leading Authority Says.
One of the leading authorities on gold and
monetary standards is Dr. Edwin W. Kemmerer, Walker
Professor of International Finance at Princeton Univer-
sity. Dr. Kemmerer has written numerous books on the
subject and has served as a banking and currency expert
to the governments of some thirteen nations. In his
testimony on the pending Gold Reserve Act of 1934 be-
fore the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Dr.
1 .
2 .
3 .
The New York Timesi
,
May 28, 1933., Sec. VIII, p. 2.
Monthly Le t ter of the National City Bank of New York,

Kenmierer siiinmarized the gold situation as follows:
"l do not think there is any evidence
at all of a deficiency in the world output of
gold.
"If I may just make a statement -I have
it right here, I think. I have been working
in that field a little, and I believe I can
give you a statement I would like to put in
the record on that.
"The Federal Reserve Board estimates
the world stock of monetary gold in the hands
of central banks and governments at the end
of 1921 -this is round numbers- at 8 billion
23 million; at the end of 1929 at 10 billion
297 million.
"This represents an average annual in-
crease (geometric) of about 3.2 percent.
For the 19 years 1913 to 1932, covering this
whole period, this world stock of monetary
gold increased 144 percent, representing an
average annual increase (geometric) of 4.8
percent. The studies of Dr . Carl Snyder of
the New York Federal Reserve Bank covering
the principal commercial countries of the
world for the period 1865 to 1914 show a
rate of increase in the physical volume of
production of the basic commodities, tons,
bushels, yards, and so forth, of approxi-
mately 3.15 percent a year. This is v/here
your monetary gold Increased at an annual
rate of 4.8 percent. The annual rate of
increase was only 1.86 for basic commodities.
"That is, the world stock of monetary
gold since 1913 had Increased much more
rapidly than the world production of basic
commodities, and meanwhile there have been
enormous economies in the use of gold. For
example, if you say that a dollar of gold
in actual hand-to-hand circulation does one
unit of money work in a year, that same
dollar of gold used as a reserve in our
Federal Reserve banks, with the credit
structure that is built upon it, and the
velocities at which our deposits circulate
as compared with money, would have its
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efficiency increased about fortyfold.
"The world is economizing on the use of
gold through developing central banks and
throu£.h increasing use of checks and through
the various devices that we have for economizing
gold—when we do that, as we have been doing it,
on a large scale, in recent years, we have
tremendous possibilities for increasing the
monetary efficiency of gold.
"The great trouble now is that the world,
instead of using its gold, is hoarding it, and
there is a world scramble for gold in the
midst of this depression. Every body is scared,
and even the countries that are off the gold
standard are piling up gold in their central
banks and not using it. Things are not moving.
Bank deposits are not moving. Money is not
moving. It is hoarded, or relatively hoarded.
"And if we once get confidence restored
in our currency and in our business, and things
begin to move again, why, we shall find we
have gold and gold in abundance."^
Confusing Cause and Effect
Economic phenomena, like the world-wide de-
pression through which we are passing, are tremendously
complex and cannot therefore be explained in terms of
a single cause or even a series of causes. The present
depression is the outcome of the operation of many
forces generated in large measure by the conditions
created by the War. To attribute the present situation
to a single cause would be to overlook the many other
causes, and, when the silver leaders--as many of them
do--explain the depression as being the result of a
1. (k)ld Reserve Act of^ 19^41 Hearings before the Committee
on Banking and Currency of the United States Senate,
75rd Cong.
,
2nd Sess., January 19 to 23, 1934, p. 214.
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shortage in the supply of gold, they are not only guilty
of ignoring the other causes, but they are offering an
eDcplanation ishich has no basis in fact. Ko institution
of human creation is perfect, and the gold standard is
.
probably no exception. Under normal economic conditions
j
the gold standard functioned satisfactorily, but, when
j
those conditions were destroyed as they were by the War,
something was bound to happen. The trouble was not
with the gold standard; the trouble lay in the economic
* maladjustments resulting from the war. A good descrip-
j
tion of the causes of the world collapse is given by
I an English writer, Hr. F. H. Hamilton, in the London
Statist of July 9, 1932:
"The Sold Standard is not infallible,
no conceivable system is. So far from being
foolproof, it is an exceedingly complex and
delicate instrument requiring skilled, ex-
perienced and honest control in order to
ensure its relatively smooth working. Other
conditions also are necessary, including a
reasonable correspondence between wages and
commodity prices, a reasonable readiness to
accept payment of international debts in
the form of goods, and a reasonable degree
of international goodwill, but it is only
on these terms that international trade
and investment can continue at all. When,
therefore, it is alleged that the Gold
i Standard has broken down, it is well to
I
remember that none of the necessary conditions
I have been satisfied, and that given the facts
j
as they exist, no system other than barter,
I
and that only on an insignificant scale,
i could have survived the series of economic
i
earthquakes to which the world has been
subjected.
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••During and since the v/ar we have
v/itnessed the transfer of nominal, and to
a large extent of actual, wealth on a
scale unprecedented in history. Creditor
nations became debtors and debtors creditors;
the hegemony of world commerce and business
passed, or seemed to pass, across the iitlantic
almost over night. Every belligerent nation,
with the exception of the United States, in-
flated its currency at one time or another.
The war treaties in the sacred cause of self-
determina.tion created some 14,000 miles of
fresh frontiers in Europe, along which the
nev/ly liberated nations erected tariff walls
of almost unscalable height, while the
United States, not to be outdone, insisted
on the payment of war debts, in order to
discourage European armaments, and raised
its already tov/ering import duties, in
order to encourage American manufacturers,
with the ridiculous result that a creditor
nation deliberately made it impossible
to receive payment of its debt.- in £iny
effective form. Meanwhile the secular
enmity between France and Germany continued,
and still continues in a subacute form, to
poison international relationships, and
sterilise every effort tov/ards peace and
goodwill. Now all this has nothing to do
with gold, and to attribute the upheaval
and dislocation from which we are suffering
to the failure of the Gold Standard to
function is sim.ply to misuse language. The
Gold Standard did not fail, it was over-
v:helmed over a large area by the impact of
forces which v/ould have pulverised and
destroyed any conceivable system of inter-
national trade or basis of credit." 1
A similar opinion v/as expressed by Dr.
Kemmerer in his testimony before the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency. dVhen asked by the chairman
of the committee to explain how the stock m3-rket crash
could occur when we were on the gold standard. Dr. Kem-
1. Quoted from the Monthly Letter of the National City
bank of New York for September, 1932, p. 142.
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merer replied that in his judgment the crash was not of
monetary origin hut was due to speculation in the market
and to a failure to recognize that fundamental economic
|
forces were at work.^ "I do not think,” he said, "it
j
p !
was due to a breakdown in the gold standard." I
The Maldistribution Problem !
!i
The world-wide collapse would have undoubtedly
happened under any monetary system. Gold is primarily
jj
a medium for international exchange and naturally monetary
,
gold stocks tend to accumulate in creditor nations. The
accumulation of some two-thirds of the world's monetary
j
jj
gold in France and the United States is the result of the ||
ij
creditor positions of these two nations and of the ab- ji
li
K
normal economic relationships created by the war. il
There is much truth, then, in the objections of the silver ll
leaders that monetary gold stocks are inequitably dis-
tributed, but it in no wise follows that the gold standard
has outlived its usefulness. !|
ii
The gold standard is not only the best, but the :J
only, international monetary standard with which the
f:
modern v/orld has had any extended experience. The time
1
may come when the peoples of the world will be willing to
accept in payment for goods and services some commodity
j
1. Gold Reserve Act of 1934 ; Hearings before the Committee
oii Banking and Currency of the United States Senate, ©2 . cit .
,
pp. 216-7.
2, Ibid. Ti^_2ia ,
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otker than gold, but it may well be doubted that that
time has yet arrived. Ihe outstanding advantage of the
gold standard is that,^old is readily accepted by all
peoples and that convertibility of a nation’s currency
into gold serves to steady the value of the currency
in the marine ts of the world. I'he world’s recent ex-
periences with currencies unanchored to gold have shown
that such currencies, gyrating upward and downward in
the foreign exchange marxets, have become both the
football of politicians and the playthings of speculators.
It is to be doubted whether any system of irredeemable
paper money can meet the world’s monetary requirements
with any degree of lasting satisfaction. i?aper
currencies are at best a temporary expedient. Sven so
practical a statesman as Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor
of the British Exchequer, was forced to admit before the
House of Commons on iJarch 7, 1936, that he could see "no
better international standard than gold” and that in his
opinion the nations of the world would ultimately return
to that international standard.^
The way bacX to gold lies in the creation of
conditions under which the gold standara will function,
and that way has been pointed out by the cold Delegation
1. ihe New York limes
,
.larch 8, 1935, p. 14
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of the League of Nations. In its official report that body
emphasized the necessity of balancing national budgets, the
desirability of lowering the reserve requirements of central
banks, the possibility of the greater use of bank checks,
the need for greater cooperation between central banks, and,
in many other ways, the possibilities of further economizing
the use of gold.^ The minority members of the Gold Delega-
tion took full cognizance of the difficulties arising from
the maldistribution of monetary gold stocks and presented
the following program as summarized by the New York Times
:
"As remedies for the present situation the
minority presents a four-point program, summarized
as follows: (1) An early settlement of the ques-
tion of war debts and reparations. (2) The re-
moval as far as possible of restraints on inter-
national trade. (3) A concerted attempt by the
principal gold-standard countries to restore
wholesale commodity prices as measured in gold
to the prevailing level of 1928, and (4) a
similar attempt by the paper-standard countries
under the leadership of sterling to stabilize
their internal price levels."^
Thus the way has been pointed out for a solution
of the maldistribution problem and for a return to the in-
ternational gold standard. Professor Kemmerer says that
there is "no evidence whatever that the world is today
suffering from an enduring shortage of gold" and that, as
soon as we are out of the present depression and governments.
1. For a summary of the Gold Delegation's report urging the
resumption of the gold standard, see the New York Times
,
June 11, 1932, p. 6.
2. Ibid.
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central banks, and individuals have ceased to hoard
gold, we shall find that the supply of monetary gold
is sufficient to maintain price levels without resort
to bimetallism,^
As to Bimetallism
The adoption of bimetallism as a means of
restoring purchasing power and price levels is unnec-
essary. The monetary gold stocks of the world, and
consequently the supply of primary money, are now
greater than at any time heretofore. Moreover, the
ever increasing use of credit instruments is rendering
progressively less the demands upon the supply of
primary money.
Bimetallism has been tried and found wanting.
During the latter part of the 19th Century the leading
nations of the world abandoned their bimetallic experi-
ments and adopted the single gold standard. The great
trouble with bimetallism lay in the impossibility of
maintaining in equilibrium for any length of time the
mint and market ratios for gold and silver. The result
was that the cheaper metal constantly drove the dearer
out of circulation. Some economists think that bimetal-
lism might work if all nations would agree to coin both gold
€Lnd silver freely and at the same ratio. Today, however,
1. E. W. Kemmerer, Kemmerer on Money
,
op . cit .
.
pp. 102-3.
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there is little interest in bimetallism except in our
own country where the silver interests see in it a means
of raising the price of silver. For the United States
to attempt to force the other nations to adopt bi-
metallism would "be like undertaking the impossible. And
to adopt bimetallism alone would be to pile even higher
the hoard of idle silver in the Treasxiry and to load our-
selves up with a lot of cheap metal which the other na-
tions do not want.
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CHAPTii^ V
THE RESTORhTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES
Increasing the Supply of Money
The second main contention of the silver leaders
is that the remonetization of silver is necessary in oraer
to restore commodi uy price levels and to s timulate the
forces of recovery. Just as the depression v/as caused by
the collapse in prices resulting from a shortage in
purchasing power, so, the leaders argue, the way out of
the depression lies in the restoration of price levels
to their former parities through increasing the pur-
chasing power of the people. And the most effective
way to place purchasing power in the hands of the people,
it is contended, would be to increase the supply of
primary money through Uie remonetization of silver.
The silver leaders deny that there is any real
overproduction of coinmodities and explain the existence
of surpluses as the inevitable result of the inability
of people to purchase the necessaries and comforts of
life. They point to the severe decline in the prices of
agricultural commodities as having destroyed the pur-
chasing power of the farmer and argue that the restora-
tion of farm rices to their former levels, and especially
to the level which prevailed in 1926, would so increase
farm purchasing power as to cause a tremendous demand for
the products of our mills and factories. In s uch a way
•-
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the wheels of industry would once again be set in motion
and the vast numbers of the unemployed be reabsorbed by
private industry. "Our real problem,” says one of the
silver leaders, "cannot be solved until the prices of
conLuOdities are raised not only above the cost of pro-
duction but to a level that will show a profit, './hen
plant operations are reduced through loss of purchasers,
car loadings fall off and nothing can restore such loss
save the restoration of the purchasing power of the
people within our country.”^
Purchasing power can be restored through the
remonetization of silver. linactment by Congress of a
bill to that effect, argued Senator V/heeler in presenting
one of his perennial silver proposals to the Senate,
would "nearly double” the volume of the world’s primary
money; cause the prices of agricultural products to be
"more than trebled” within a year; increase the purchasing
povTer of "over 50 percent of the entire world ^s population
nov/ using silver”; within 2 years cause agricultural
land values throughout the United States to be "more
than c^uadrupled”
;
and would solve the problem of un-
2
employment. imd, as a result of these beneficient
T~, Hon. Key Pittman, "Silver and the Commodity Price Level ,
”
Congressional Record
,
73d Cong. 1st Sess., April 17, 1933,
p . 13*^ o •
2. Congressional Record
,
75d Cong. 1st Sess., April 17, 1935i
p. 1807. The proposal, submitted in the form of an amendment
to the proposed Banking Act of 1933, called for the remoneti 2 ,
ticn of silver at the old ratio of 16-1.
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effects of the remonetization of silver, the Senator added:
"Contentment, happiness, and lucrative occupation would "be
substituted for discontent and despair
Such are the optimistic hopes and predictions
of the silver leaders who have such great faith in the
magic powers of the white metal, llost of them believe
that by injecting silver into the currency it is not
only possible to raise prices but to restore them to the
level which prevailed in 1926 and that the restoration
of the 1926 level of prices would mean a return of our
former prosperity, iuoreover, they argue that an increase
in the volume of hard money made possible by the remioneti-
zation of silver is desired by the masses of people and
that it would go far toward increasing their confidence
in the currency*
The Q,uantitative Theory
The argument that prices can be raised by in-
creasing the supply of money is based on what in discus-
sions of the silver issue has been called the quantitative
theory of money. According to this theory, as originally
2
stated by economists, the value of money varies inversely
and prices directly with the quantity of money in circula-
tion. It has long been recognized, however, that as a
1* Congressional Record
,
op . cit
.
,
p. 1807.
2* It should be noted, however, that among economists this
is more properly known as the quantity theory of money.
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formula of price phenomena this is much too simple a
statement, yet the silver leaders apparently accept it,
for their case for the remonetization of silver is based
directly upon the quantitative theory of money. In 1933
one of the friends of silver in the Senate gave his
conviction ’’that there is something in the quantitative
theory of money” as one of his reasons for voting for a
proposal to remonetize silver at the old ratio of 16 to
1. It is quite fair, then, in any discussion of the case
for silver rem.onetization to inquire whether the quantita-
tive theory is a valid theory of price.
Is it a Valid Theory?
It is true that the quantity of money is an
important factor in the determination of prices, but so
are changes in the supply of, and the demand for, goods.
It is possible, let us say, for the price of a particular
good or goods to fall because of an increase in the supply
of, or a decrease in the demand for, that good or goods
with no change at all in the quantity of money. And, in
like manner, the price may rise because of an increase
in the demand for, or a decrease in the supply of, that
good or goods while the quantity of money may remain
unchanged. In other words, the exponents of the quanti-
tative theory overlook price changes which are the
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result of changes in the value of goods rather than of
changes in the value of money. It is obvious, then, that
there are factors in the price situation which cannot be
accounted for in a purely monetary explanation.
Our experience during this depression has shovm
that the relationship between prices and the quantity of
money in circulation may be destroyed. All through the
period of this depression, with the exception of the
slight drop in 1930, there has been as much and more
money in circulation that there was in the years 1928
and 1929. The following statistics regarding the amount
of money in circulation show that we have suffered from
no shortage in the supply of money and that for at least
the past three years money in circulation has exceeded
the figures for any time during the boom period.
TABLE III
June 30
1928
1927
1928
1929
1930
MONEY IN CIRCUL>.TI0N1
June 30
$4,885,266,064 1931
4,851,321,131 1932
4,796,626,257 1933
4,746,296,562 1934
4,521,987,962
$4,821,933,298
5,695,171,375
5,720,764,384
5,373,469,752
1. Quoted from •'Stock of Money in the
United States," World almanac and Book of Facts
for 1935
. p. 291.
There has, then, been no shortage in the supply
of money, and, if the quantitative theory were valid, prices
would be high instead of low. V/e have had enough money in

oiroulatioD to support as high, if not a higher, price
level than that which prevailed in 19E6. The explanation,
of course, is that the quantitative theory of money is
not a valid theory of price and that the low price levels
of recent years have been the result in large measure of
the existence of surplus commodities rather than of
changes in the quantity of money.
If the restoration of 19E6 prices were a
matter of the supply of money alone, the situation would
present no difficulty. Kot only has money in circulation
increased, but figures show a considerable growth in the
nation’s total stock of money. As a result of the presi-
dential proclamation of January 31, 1934, cutting the
gold content of the dollar from E5.8 grains of gold
nine-tenths fine to 15 5/e 1 grains nine-tenths fine, we
created "literally out of thin air"^ a gold profit of
$2,812,000,000. Our gold reserves are now the highest
on record, reaching on January 30, 1935, the heretofore
unparalleled level of $8,387,000,000,^ and the total
money supply of the nation has been increased from
$10,209,624,041 on December 31, 1933, to $14,306,813,806
1. Phrase used by Professor James Harvey Rogers, of Yale,
in his testimony on the pending Gold Reserve Act of 1934
before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency. SeeT^ Gold Reserve Act 1934 : Hearings
, etc., cit
p • 312 ,
2. Christian Science Monitor
, Peb. 1, 1935, p. 13.
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on Decem'ber 31, 1934, the highest figure on record.^ In
1
view of these considerations it would he indeed difficult
j
to prove a case for silver remonetization, or for any other
j
form of currency inflation, based on an alleged deficiency
I
in the supply of money.
i
i iijiother element in the price situation is the
i
use of checks in effecting the exchange of goods and services..
1
Since more than 90 per cent of American business is done on
1
the basis of checks rather than on the basis of actual cash,
any determination of the supply of exchange media which
fails to take into account the use of checks does not present
a true picture of the situation. Moreover, in basing their
argument for the restoration of price levels on the need for
more actual money, a need which it has been shown does not
exist, the advocates of silver remonetization have ignored
completely the availability of bank credit and the price-
raising possibilities of its greater and more extensive
use. The total amount of such credit available for the
use of agriculture, commerce, and industry is a matter of
i
estimate. Surveys in this field have been few, but the
besc obtainable figures indicate that in this country credit
exists in superabundance.
1
1. Circulation Statement of United States Money -December
.
31, 1934. See the Comri.ercial and Financial Chronicle,
February 9, 1935, p. 889.
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in 1934 a survey on Lhe availability of bank
credit was made by the Association of Keserve City Bankers
lhe results vi/ere most enlightening. In a letter, binder
date of November 8, to Ivir. Raymond Moley, the text of
which appears in the Commercial and rlnancial Glironicle^
for November 10, 1934, mr. hyrnan E. Wakefield, president
of the Association, stated that the sumf'ey showed an un-
used credit of from $8,000,000,000 to $10,000,000,000.
A fev; pertinent excerpts follov;:
great volume of credit, nov; readily
available at rates probably the lov/est in his-
tory, is at the disposal of those who v/ant it
and are properly entitled to use it.
"A group of banks with deposits of about
$13 ,000 j 000, 000
p
representing over 35% of the
CO- mercial banking deposits of the country,
report total lines of credit grantee or
available at the present time of $6,165,000,000.
Of these credit commitments the total loans
outstanding' is $1,950,000,000. In other vjords,
this group of banks has established lines of
credit v/hich are 'unused to the extent of
roughly $4,2000,000,000, or an amount equal to
over 30% of their total deposits. If these
figures are ty'ical it may be estimated that
for all commercial banks in the co'untry the
credit commitments made and unused probably
aggregate something like $8,000,000,000 or
$10
,
000
,
000
,
000 ."
A more recent report comes from the Federal
He serve Bank of Kev; York. In its report for the year
1934 the Bank points out that the huge reserves of
member banl^s of the jj’ederal Reserve Bystem would support
an expansion of credit which would raise bank deposits

to about $80,000,000,000. "Recent aata for all banks
throughout the country," says the bank, "are not available,
but on the basis of member bank aata it seems likely that
total aeposits of all banks at the ena of 1934 were in
the neighborhood of $44,000,000,000, exclusive of inter-
bank deposits. In view of the fact that all member
banks have excess reserves averaging around 85 per cent
of their reauirea reserves, the present volume of bank
reserves presuraabl y would support an expansion of credit
which would raise bank aeposits to something like
$80,000,000,000, compared with an average of about
$55,000,000,000 of deposits in 1929."^
There can be no question regarding the adequacy
of the volume of credit. The figures contained in the
report of the federal Reserve Bank of New York were ex-
clusive of government deposits which, if included,
would raise the total amount of available credit. Through-
out the course of the depression bank credit has been
supplemented by government credit, especially as extended
through the Reconstruction finance Corporation and the
numerous other lending agencies of the government. The
liberalization of the rediscount facilities of the federal
Reserve bystem, authorization to federal Reserve banks
to make direct loans to industry, anu innumerable other
banking and currency changes have all been part ana parcel
1. Quoted from the JNew York limes, March ^9, 1935. p. 35.
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of the government *s policy of making credit cheap and
abunaant ana it has succeeaed in that policy.
The price structure, however, is not a matter
of the supply of money and credit alone; there is
another element in the situation ana that Is the rate
or velocity at which money and credit are turned over
or circulate. A revised statement of the quantitative
theory should make due allov/ance not only for the
quantity of money and crealt but also for the rate at
which they are turned over, for an increase in the
velocity of monetary circulation or the rate of credit
turnover has the same effect as an Increase in the
supply of money or the supply of credit. The supply
of money and credit has been, and is, sufficient to
support a far higher level of prices than now exists.
In fact, the supply of potential exchange media is
far greater now than it was during the boom period.
What is needed today is not an Increase in the supply
of money, either through the remonetization of silver
or otherwise, but a restoration of confidence to such
an extent that the existing supply of money and credit,
and especially credit, will be put to greater anu more
effective use. When the forces of recovery shall have
gained sufficient momentum, it will be found that price
levels will rise through greater utilization of existing
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The Question of Desirability
The silver leaders’ argument for the restora-
tion of the 1926 level of prices can be attacked on the
ground of desirability. Would the restoration of the
1926 level of prices, or of any other price level of the
boom period, be desirable? In the last analysis economic
prosperity is not a matter of the restoration or
existence of a particular level of prices, but is a
matter of having all parts of the economic mechanism in
proper balance. The silver leaders, of course, argue
that the restoration of 1926 prices would restore
balance in the present order, but such argument is open
to grave question. Is it not possible that balance
will be restored on the basis of lovtrer price levels
which ultimately will rise as business expands? That at
least has been the experience in past periods of de-
pression. The fallacy of restoring the 1926 level of
prices has been well presented by Dr. Spahr, Chairman
of the Department of Economics of the School of Commerce
of New York University. He says:
"Those who assume that the price level
of 1926 is the one to which we should return,
either because it is supposed to be the debt
level or because it is the proper or ideal
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one, can provide no well establishe
reasons whatever for such an assumption
.
There is nothing in economics that will
support such an assumption. The only
’ideal’ or ’proper’ price level known
in economics is the one which prevails
when production ana consumption are in
a state of equilibrium. After a country
has passed through a business recession
and depression, there is no possible way
of knowing in advance just when or where
this equilibrium, and consequently the
proper price level, will be attained.'*^
Possibility of the Plan
Y/hether it would be possible to restore
price levels and stimulate the processes of recovery
by means of the remonetization of silver is a matter
of doubt. Money, it must be remembered, is not the
source of purchasing pov/er nor is it the motive power
behind business activity; it is simply a medium for
the exchange of goods ana services. "Goods and services,"
writes Professor iily, "are exchanged for goods and
services, in the proper functioning of economic society,
money and credit are simply the instruments -the media
-
whereby goods and services are exchanged."^ This simple
statement brings out clearly the fundamental nature
of all trade, namely, that goods and services exchange
for other goods ana services. The part played by money
1. Spahr, V/. jj*., "The Mistakes of ini’laters," American
Bankers’ Association Journal, January 1934, p. 51
.
2. Quoted from the Monthly liOtter of the national City
Bank of I^'ew York for October, 1933, p. 153.
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Is distinctly secondary; it is not the money which
creates the exchange but rather the exchange which
calls into use the money. There is nothing new or
unusual about this; it is simply a statement of fun-
damental economic relationships such as may be found
in any elementary economics textbook.
’’The service of money," explains the National
City bank of New York, "is analogous to that of means
of transportation or the service of railroad cars.
This is a fundamentally difrerent iaea from that which
conceives money to be the motive power behind all
business and that more and more money will always make
more and more business. Enough cars are needed to
handle the traffic, but you cannot create traffic by
1
multiplying the number of cars."
And, in like manner, it might be added, you
cannot create business simply by adding to the supply
of money. It is the volume of business which determines
the amount of money in circulation and not vice versa.
Moreover, it may well be doubted whether the
in;jection of silver into the currency would increase the
amount of money in circulation. If the volume of business
were not sufficient to keep the added silver currency in
circulation, it would simply return to the banks where
1. Monthly Letter of the national City Bank of New York
for October. 1933, p. 153.
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it would pile up in excess reserves. If, however, the
banks were required by law to force silver currency into
circulation, as many of the silver leaders demand, the
silver would drive other and better forms of money out
of circulation. Silver is at best an inelastic form
of currency and by driving Federal Reserve notes from
circulation it would deprive our currency of that
elastic element which has for so long been the pride of
the authors of the Reserve System. If that should hap-
pen, our currency would be perceptibly weakened.
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CH^JPTER VI
THE RESTORATION OF V/ORLD PRICES
The Fall in Silver
'I
'I
j
The fall in the price of silver since the war period
has been a source of profound disappointment to all friends of
j
;
the white metal. From the high point of $1.38 an ounce reach-
I
ed in 1919 silver fell in 1920 to as low as 60.8 cents per
ounce. In 1927 another fall occurred in the price of the
metal, resulting in large measure from the action of the
Indian Government in disposing of part of its vast silver
I
i
reserves. .Vith the coming of the depression in 1929 silver
I
i| fell again and during the early depression years continued
in the downward direction. The disappointing story of the
fall in the price of silver is recorded in the following
table
.
TABLE IV
PRICE OF SILVERI
(New York, per fine ounce)
Year Averas:e Hi^h Low
1919 $1,121 $1,388 $1,018
1920 1.019 1.368 .608
1921 .631 .738 .532
1922 .679 .742 .629
1923 .652 .690 .629
1924 .671 .724 .630
1925 .694 .732 .668
1926 .624 .689 .518
1927 .567 .603 .542
1928 .585 .639 .568
1929 .533 .578 .468
1930 .385 .472 .311
1931 .290 .376 .261
1932 .282 .313 .246
1. From Table No. 691, "SILVER: Price
,
and Value of oilver in the Dollar," Statistical
Abstract of the United States
. 1933, p. 673.

It will be noted that In 1932 silver fell to a
record low of slightly more than 24 cents an ounce. The
situation was such that weaker souls might have been dis-
couraged, but not so with the friends of silver. They
seized upon the situation, took advantage of it, and made
the low price of silver the basis of one of their most
appealing argximents for the remonetization of the white
metal
•
The Purchasing Power of the Orient
The low price of silver, it is argued, has de-
stroyed the purchasing power of the silver-using countries
whose peoples comprise ’’over 60 per cent of the peoples of
the world.” And the restoration of that purchasing power,
we are told, lies in the remonetization of silver by the
Congress of the United States. The argument runs something
as follows:
It would be possible through silver remone-
tization to raise the world price of silver. The
increased price of silver in the world markets
would so increase the value of the silver holdings
of the peoples of India and China as to enable
them to buy the products of the rest of the world.
It is argued that if silver were remonetized the
purchasing power of these neoples would "con-
temporaneously be doubled”^ and that the resulting
demand for the raw materials and manufactured
products of the rest of the world would cause
world commodity prices to rise and thereby
stimulate the forces of world recovery.
1. Senator B. K. ’^'/heeler in speech before the Senate, Con-
gressional Record
,
Jan. 24, 1933, p. 2492
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One of the silver senators in speaking for the
remonetization of silver before the Committee on Coinage,
Weights, and Measures of the House of Representatives in
the early part of 1933 expressed the aim of his bill in
these words:
"What I seek is to restore the purchasing
power of the depreciated currencies of China
and other silver-using countries ... This will
help in the purchase of the world’ s surplus
production, thus lifting it off the world's
domestic markets and thereby increasing cormnodity
and property prices, which, in my opinion, is
the essential thing to a return of universal
prosperity . "
1
Such, then, is the argument of the silver leaders.
Silver remonetization would not only raise domestic prices;
it would do far more. It would increase world purchasing
power; raise world prices; and promote universal recovery.
Such is indeed an ambitious program, and, as such, is
typical of the many economic panaceas which have been born
of, or .resurrected during, the period of the present de-
i
pre ssion.
Confusing Cause and Effect
The argument that the decreased purchasing pov/er
of the Orient was caused by the fall in the value of silver
has little if any basis in fact. The fact of the matter is
that the fall in the price of silver was the result of re-
!• Statement by Hon. Key Pittman on "Remonetization and
Stabilization of Silver Without Disturbing Gold Standard,"
Feb. 2, 1933. The text appears in the Congressional Record,
April 17, 1933, pp. 1825-9. i

duced silver consumption by the Orient and that the cause
of that reduced consumption was a shrinkage in the purchasing
power of the silver-using countries resulting from a decline
in the value of their exports and not from the shrinkage in
the value of silver. 1 These facts have been pointed out by
no less an authority than the firm of Handy & Harman, noted
dealers in silver bullion, who, in their annual review of
the silver market for 1932, stress several important con-
siderations which the silver leaders have apparently
ignored.
In the first place, it is pointed out that during
the early years of the depression the amount of newly mined
silver absorbed by India and China steadilr declined with
the exception of a slight increase in 1930. "In 1929, when
production reached its peak of 260,900,000 ounces, the net
imports of the two countries amounted to 218,500,000 ounces,
or nearly 84 per cent. In 1930 they absorbed 88 per cent
and in 1931 they took 68 per cent. In the last year, how-
ever, although production declined to 160,600,000 ounces,
India and China used only 52,000,000 ounces, or 32 per cent.
India and China are importers, and not exporters, of silver,
and the opinion is expressed that had not their purchasing
If \l
1. See "declares Silver deoends on Orient," a summary of the
contents of Handy & Harman’s annual review of the silver markl^t
for 1932, the New York Times
.
Jan. 10, 1933.
2. Ibid
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power been curtailed by the fail in the value of their ex-
ports, these countries would have taken advantage of the
low price of silver to increase their purchases or bullion.
This is the view of handy & harman. They say:
"if these countries were exporters of silver,
there is no question but that their purchasing
power would have been adversely affected by the
lower prices for the white metal 'which prevailed in
the markets of the world, un the contrary, India
and china are known to be large importers of silver
under normal conditions, and, therefore, their
purchases of bullion should have increased during
a year when silver rates were the lowest in history,
had not their ability to buy been curtailed from
some other cause, isuch cause, according to our
previously expressed opinion is the shrinkage in
the value obtainable in the world markets for
those products which india and China ao export,
and not the shrinkage in the value of silver.
This contention, we believe, is substantiated by
an analysis of statistics covering the prices and
volume of commodities exported from the orient
and the prices and volume of silver imported."^
On the basis of these considerations the content! on
that the fall in the price of silver caused a decrease in
the purchasing power of the orient would appear to be a
confusion of cause and effect. The ability of India and
china to purchase the gooos of the rest of the world is de
terrained by the value of their exports in international
trade rather than by the value of their silver.
It
chasing power
would the Tlan V/orkv
is very difficult to understand hov; the pur-
of the silver-using countries would be increas od
1. 'ciuoted from the wew ifork Times, Jan. 10, 1953.
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by a rise in the price of silver. The only countries now
on the silver standard are China, Abyssinia, and Eritrea,^
The latter two are relatively unimportant. The people of
India, it is true, possess vast hoards of silver. India is
not on the silver standard, but for many years she has im-
ported silver as a matter of trade balance. In effect, she
buys silver with the goods she sells abroad. A rise in
the price of silver would not, then, increase but would
decrease her purchasing power abroad, since more in the
way of goods and services would be required to purchase a
given amount of the white metal.
While India as a nation imports silver, her
government, having detached the currency from silver, would
like to dispose of some of its vast silver reserves.^ Thus
far it has been unsuccessful in doing so,^ but should the
price of silver rise and the government succeed in selling
at a high price more silver than the nation buys, it would
be possible for exporters to profit on the exchange. In
such a case, foreign nations would have to accept silver
in exchange for goods sold to India and thus far they have
been interested in disposing of their silver but not in
acquiring more of it. Moreover, the increased sales of
1. Charles Merz, "Again the Silver Question is Debated,”
the New York Times. April 22, 1934, Sec. VIII, p. 1.
2. See supra, pp. 35-6.
3. See supra, p. 36
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silver by the Indian government would depress the price
oi the metal so that in the end any plan to increase the
price oi silver would result in its own deieat.
C!hina, lihe India, is an importer oi silver.
iiJach year silver ilows into the country on trade balance.
A rising price lor silver would increase the vaiue ol
Ohina’s silver and in turn the veiue ol the Jhinese dollar,
but it would not increase CJhina’s purchasing power in inter-
j
1 i
national trade. China’s purchasing power in international
\
I
trace, liice that oi any other nation, is determined, in
|
the final analysis, by the value ol the goods she exports,
and a rising price ol silver would increase the amount ol
Chinese goods necessary to purchase a given amount ol the
white metal. A high price tor silver, then, decreases
China’s ability to purchase in international trade.
Since China is on the silver standard, a rise in
the price ol silver would have a deflationary effect on her
domestic price levels. A higher price lor silver would
cause an increase in the value ol the Chinese dollar, and,
as the dollar rises in value, commodity price levels in
China tend to fall. ”It is hard to believe," writes Pro-
fessor Kemmerer, "that the proponents of silver in the
Unitec States, who have shown such great solicitude for the
poor people of China ..., should want to adopt a policy
1. Charles naerz, "Again the Silver Question is Debated,"
loc. cit.
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that, by raising the value of silver in China and depressing
oomnjodity prices, would increase the debt burdens of the
Chinese people and, in short, impose upon China ’all the
hardships of deflation' from which the silver group propose
to relieve the American people by the remonetization of
silver,
China, then, is not interested in a high price :
for silver; she wants cheap silver. As the price of silver
falls the value of the Chinese dollar decreases, and more
(dollars are required to purchase a given amount of goods
|
and services in China. ^ In other words, prices in China .
tend to rise. This actually happened, writes Charles Merz
in the Jjew York Times , from 1929 to 1951, "when the index
of such prices advanced from 1C4 to 126. '<»hile other
countries were experiencing deflation, China enjoyed rising
prices and a boom.”^
The purchasing power of the Orient is not de-
pendent upon a high price for silver. International trade
consists fundamentally of the exchange of goods and serviceii
by the people of one nation for those of the peoples of
other nations, and the ability of any people to command
foreign goods and services is determined largely by the val;
of those which they have to offer in exchange. Just as the
1.
fcemmerer on Koney, op. cit., p. 151.
e
2.
Charles Merz, "Again the Question of Silver is Debated,”
op . cit .
3.
Ibid
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fall in the value of the exports of India and China caused
a decrease in the demand for silver, with a consequent drop
in the price of the metal, so, when the value of their ex-
ports increases, a renewed demand for silver will tend to
force the price of the metal upward. A higher price re-
sulting from a natural increase in the demand for the
metal would establish the price of silver on a sound basis,
but a higher price, induced artificially by means of re-
monetization, would, by further curtailing the buying power
of the Orient and inflicting upon China the burden of de-
flation, retard, rather than promote, the forces of world
recovery.
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CriAPTSR VII
THE ROOSEVELT POLICIES
Background of the Situation
During the early stages of the depression the sil-
ver leaders lost no time in bringing the question of silver
into the forum of public discussion. The more radical of them
claimed openly that the depression -was caused by a shortage
in the supply of primary money and that the way to better time
lay in the remonetization of silver. The leaders were espe-
cially concerned over the drop in the price of the metal, and
consequently directed their efforts toward rehabilitating
silver in the market and ending the slump in the silver in-
dustry. All friends of silver were much disturbed by the
practice of other nations in debasing silver coins and in
the action of the Indian government in demonetizing silver.
In Februarj'- of 1931 a resolution introduced into the Senate
by Senator Pittman went so far as to place the blame for the
decline in the price of silver on the demonetization of sil-
ver by the Indian government and the debasement of silver
1
coins by other governments. The resolution, adopted by
the Senate, called upon President Hoover to call an inter-
national conference for the purpose of ending the slump in
silver. The failure of the adrainistration to take action on
the resolution was no cause for discouragement to the friends
1. The New York Times, Feb. 21, 1931, p. 29, col. 1
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of the white metal who continued to push forv/ard their pro-
gram for action on silver. In December of the same year a
bill Introduced into the Senate by Senator Dill proposed the
creation of a coram.ission to confer with other governments for
the establishment of silver as a basis for currency and for-
1
eign exchange. And in the following month, January of 1952,
Senator Wheeler revived the plea for the outright reraonetiza-
2
tion of silver at the old ratio of 16 to 1.
In the latter days of the Hoover administration
other silver bills appeared in Congress. In January, 1933,
Senator Dill proposed that the government purchase silver
3
bullion and pay for it by the issue of silver currency. In
the same month Senators Long and Wheeler offered silver
amendments to the Glass Banking bill. The Long amendment
would have reduced the weight of the silver dollar from
412.5 to 371.25 grains and would have authorized the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to purchase any quantity of silver
necessary to raise the ratio of silver to gold to about 14
to 1 and to pay for such silver with silver certificates
4
having legal tender power. The Wheeler amendment provided
1. The New York Times,, Dec. 15, 1931, p. 1, col. 8. Also
p. 6, col. 3.
2. The New York Times
,
Jan. 26, 1932, p. 12, col. 6.
3. See the New York Times , Jan. 10, 1933, p. 2, col. 3.
4. See the Commercial & Financial Chronicle
,
Jan. 28, 1933,
pp. 531-3, 594-^.
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for the remonetization of silver at the old ratio of
16 to 1.^ Both amendments were opposed by Senator Glass,
who was trying to secure the enactment of his banking
bill, and, after a spirited debate on the floor of the
Senate, in v/hich all of the old arguments for silver re-
monetization were revived and in which remonetization was
bitterly attacked by Senator Reed, both amendments were
tabled by a vote of 56 to 18.^
In February several other silver bills were
offered, ranging all the way from the purchase by the
government of a specified number of ounces of silver each
month to the taking by the government of the entire out-
put of the silver mines* In principle the Somers bill,
presented in the House, resembled in many ways that of the
Bland-Allison and Sherman Acts of the previous century.
The bill, however, was more elaborate in that it aimed
definitely at raising the price of silver by providing
for a graduated increase in the price at which the govern-
I
I
I
ment should purchase the metal. The Treasury was to be
1. See the Hew York Times, Jan. 24, 1953, p. 5, col. 1.
Also the Commercial & Financial Chronicle
,
Jan. 28, 1933,
loc . cit .
2. Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., Jan. 24, 1933,
pp. 2535-6. For the debate on the amendments, see ibid., pp ,
2491-2518, 2523-2536. See also the New York Times, Jan. 25,
1933, p. 1, col. 4, and the Commercial &'~Financial Chronicle »
Jan. 28, 1933, pp. 594-6.
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authorized to purchase, against the issue of silver
certificates, some 40,000,000 ounces of silver bullion
each month at a fixed purchase price of 40 cents per
fine ounce for the first three months, 50 cents for the
next three months, and at a graduated rising scale of
prices after 60 cents an ounce had been reached and
maintained for three months,^ This bill was one of the
most ingenious devices ever proposed for inflating the
currency and raising the price of silver. As the New
York Times pointed out, its adoption would have put the
government "into the silver business on a large scale.
The initial purchase price fixed by the bill was 14 cents
above the market price, and, by purchasing silver at 40
cents an ounce, the Times pointed out, the government
would spend ^16,000,000 monthly for metal then v/orth
about $10,000,000 in the market.^ "As a subsidy to the
silver industry," said the Times
,
"the bill naturally
will be warmly approved in some quarters, but impartial
persons will be reminded of the government's awkward ex-
perience with other commodities more easily 'regulated'
than silver.''^ The bill, together with a similar measure
1. The New York Times
,
Feb. 19, 1933.
2. Ibid .
3. Ibid.
4.
Ibid

sponsored by Kepresentative bteagall, was killed in commit-
tee . i
While net as elaborate in its provisions as the
Somers bill, yet just as far reaching in its aims and pur-
poses, was a measure introduced into the Senate by senator
Pittman authorizing the government to take over the entire
silver mine output of the country. ^ i-he bill would have au-
thorized the issue of silver certificates against the bullion
so acquired. If the Somers bill would have put the govern-
ment "into the silver business on a large scale," this bill,
hau it been enacted into law, woula have presented to the
government the entire silver industry of the country to have,
to support, and to nurture probably forever.
The Thomas Amendment
In the early years of the depression the silver
leaders got no sympathy from the administration at Washington,
but, with the inauguration of the rioosevelt administration,
they found in office an administration which, if not aggres-
sively desirous of doing something for silver, was at least
willing to lend a sympathic ear to proposals for greater mon-
etary use of the white metal. Moreover, the Roosevelt ad-
ministration came into office at a time when the attention of
1. The New York Times
,
Feb. 22, 1933, p. 31.
2. The New York Times
.
Feb. 3, 1933, p. 2, col. 1.
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'! the country was focused on the banking and currency situation.
ii
I
j
The collapse of the nation’s banks and the wide-spread popular
|
jl interest in all proposals, hov/ever radical or unsound, for
changing our banking and monetary systems gave to the silver
leaders a most propitious opportunity for presenting their case
jl
for silver to the people of the country. Not since 1896 had
i there been such popular interest in the money question and not
since then had the public been in a more receptive mood toward
the possibility of silver legislation.
The drive for legislation on silver began in the
Senate where Senator \Vheeler offered an amendment providing for
the remonetization of silver at the old ratio of 16 to 1 to the
I
'
pending Farm Relief bill of 1935. The old arguments for silver
remonetization, so familiar to the student of monetary history,
'
j
' were resurrected, revived, and presented to the Senate.^ After
|
I !
|j
a lengthly debate on the proposed amendment, the Senate by a
|
Ij vote of 43 to 33 rejected the proposal. The vote was undoubt
i!
!'
II edly hastened by the announcement of Senator Robinson, the Dem-
ocratic floor leader, that this and other proposed silver i
amendments to the farm bill were not desired by the President.^
I
The amendment was rejected, but the vote was highly significant i
i!
i| inasmuch as it demonstrated conclusively the growing strength
il
1. For the debate on the proposed amendment see the Gongres - i
Ii sional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 17, 1933, pp. 1604-29.
I-
I
‘ 2. Congressional Record, ibid., p. 1829.
I,
'I
3. Ibid., p. 1822. See also the New York Times , April 18, 1933i
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or the silver forces. As the ‘rimes pointeu out. currency in-
nation in the form of silver remonetization was beaten, but
"t^'ose in favor of it shov/ed surprising strength ana a shift
i
of six votes woula have carrieu the measure.”!
j
The rejection of the amenuraent was a blow to the sil- i
ver leaders, but their defeat was short-lived. Popular senti-
j
ment for currency inflation was running strong throughout the
country, ana, as the debate on the Farm iteiief bill progressed,
it became certain that when the bill finally passed it would
contain some provision for inflation of the currency. The in-
j
flationist leaders in the Senate haa determined to force the
issue ana, carrying their aemanas directlv to the President,
they finally succeeded in gaining administration approval for
an inflation amendment to the farm bill. The amendment, pop-
ularly knovm as the Thomas Inflation rtider, was offered in the
senate on April 20 by Senator Thomas of Oklahoma and on the
following day was reported out of the banking and Currency
committee. The amendment would have authorized the President:
2
(1) To direct the expansion of credit through Fed-
eral Reserve bank purchases of government securities in
the open market In an amount not to exceed f5,000,000,000.
(2) To direct the issue of United States notes, or
Greenbacks, in an amount up to ^3,000,000,000.
(3) To reduce the gold content of the dollar by not
more than 50 per cent.
1. The New York Times, Apr. 18, 1933, p. 1.
2. For the text of the proposed amendment see the Commercial &
financial chronicle, April 22, 1933. pp. 2719-20, Also, ibid.,
pp. 271^-9.
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I
j
I
I
I
i
4* To accept silver in payment of war-debt obliga-
j
tions to us at a price of not more than 50 cents an i
ounce, such silver to be used as a base for the issue \
new currency,
j
I
In the Senate consideration of the Thomas Amendment
1
j
evoked a sharp and acrimonious debate which lasted for a week, !
i
From April 21 to 28 the discussion waged, covering all phases
\
I
of the inflationary proposals. Among the supporters of the I
I
measure there was a wide divergence of opinion, the radicals
I
maintaining that its provisions should be made mandatory,
while the more conservative elements counseled a policy of
'
I
caution with the execution of such far reaching powers vested
in the discretion of the President,
The opposition to the amendment was led by the con-
|
servative Republican members of the Senate, who were joined
by the few anti-inflation Democrats who remained in that body.
The disastrous consequences of past experiences with currency
|
inflation as well as the dangers of vesting in one man such
vast power as the amendment proposed were portrayed vividly
to the Senate, but the warnings of the sound money group
were to go unheeded by the members of a "new deal” Congress
I
bent on tinkering with the currency,
i
The debate in the Senate was not without its re-
percussions throughout the country. Many admirable newspaper i
editorials appeared in opposition to the entire financial
policies of the government. In particular, the Commercial & i
Financial Chronicle, probably the leading financial journal
i
in America, condemned our recent abandonment of the gold I
1
I

standard as appearing "like a sheer act of recklessness,"
calculated to undo all that Grover Cleveland had accomplished
In his valiant fight for sound money. 1 The provisions of
the Thomas Amendment were characterized as legislation of "a
most startling character," climaxing a situation which was
already had enough. 2 Said the Chronicle in reference to the
amendment: "We have no hesitation in saying that nothing
wilder or more mischievous has ever been proposed in the legis-
lative history of the United States, nor anything more destruc-
tive to sound monetary and economic doctrines."^
And so the battle waged, the opponents of the amend-
ment attacking it from all sides and its proponents defending
its provisions as necessary in the interests of rising prices
and recovery. On April 28 the amendment passed the Senate by
a vote of 64 to 21 and on May 3 the House by a vote of 307 to
86. It became, then, part of the Farm Relief Act which was
approved by the President on May 12, 1933.
In its final form the amendment was substantially
the same as originally presented to the Senate. There was,
however, one significant change, and that had to do with the
coinage of silver. As originally presented to the President
for consideration, the Thomas amendment contained a provision
for the free coinage of silver. This provision had been de-
leted when the President made known his opposition to it, but,
1. "the Commercial & Financial Chronicle, Apr. S2 , 1^33, p.
2653.
2. Ibid
.
.
p. 2654.
3. Ibid.
.
p. 2655.
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by the adoption on April 26 of the "Vheeler-King Amendment au-
thorizing the President to fix the ratio between gold and sil-
ver and to provide for the unlimited coinage of gold and silve^
at the ratio so fixed, ^ the Senate incorporated into the bill
provision for free silver. This disposition of the matter lefilt
the question of silver coinage, at least for the time being, t;>
the discretion of the President,
^
Ratification of 'Vorld Silver Agreement
The Thomas Amendment was a compromise between the Adff
ministration and the radical inflationists who favored manda-
tory legislation for inflating the currency. The public did nbt
know how the President would use, or what he would do with, thii
vast powers entrusted to him, and the resulting doubt concerni:ig
the future monetary policies of the administration was suffici
to appease for the moment the various groups of currency manip
ulators. The significance of the whole affair lay in the fact
that it demonstrated the strength of the inflationist group in
Congress and that the administration had been forced to give
official recognition not only to the advocates of cheap credit;
i
t
but to the three leading inflationist groups, the greenbackersi
the devaluationists, and the silverites.
!ile
,
1, For test of amendment see the Commercial & Financial Chroni
April 29, 1933, p, 2895,
2. For the full text of the silver provisions of the Thomas Ami^nd-
ment see Title III of the Farm Relief Act, the text of which
appears Commercial & Financial Chronicle, May 20, 1933,
pp. 3415-20,
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Interest in the monetary situation soon shifted from
the domestic to the international scene* The long-planned-for
World Economic and Monetary Conference convened in London on
June 12* It was expected that the conference would deal with
such complicated world problems as exchange restrictions, sta-
bilization ©f currencies, removal of trade barriers, and the
raising of world price levels. High hopes were held for its
accomplishments* The silver interests were well represented
on the American delegation to the conference and plans had
been laid oy them far in advance for effecting, if possible, a
world agreement on silver. The world gathering, however, came
to an untimely end, without accomplishing any oi its major
purposes, by the refusal of the American government to enter-
tain any plan for the stabilization of currencies. The Confer-
ence adjourned on July 27, and, while it was generally regarded
as having been a failure, it had made, at least in the mind of
the silverlte, one outstanding accomplishment, and that was an
International agreement on silver*
The President, by a proclamation of dec* 21, 1933,
ratified ©n the part ©f the linited states the silver agree-
ment entered into at the Vi/orld Economic and Monetary Confer-
ence by the representatives of sixty-six governments. The
resolution proposing the agreement had been presented to the
Conference by the American delegation and was unanimously a-
dopted. It provided that among these sixty-six governments;
1. The policy and practice of melting up or debasing
silver coins should be abandoned.
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8. Low-valued silver currency should be replaced
with silver coins,
3. Legislation depreciating the value of silver
should not be enacted.^
In a separate and supplemental agreement, also sponso
ed by the American delegation, between the silver-holding coun-
tries, China, India, and Spain, on the one hand, and the silver
producing countries, Australia, Canada, Mexico, Peru, and the
United States, on the other hand, it was agreed that for a
period of four years commencing January 1, 1934:
1, The silver-holding countries should limit their sales
of silver in the world markets,
a, China was not to sell any silver derived from
the melting up or debasement of silver coin,
b, India was not to sell more than 35,000,000
ounces annually.
Spain was not to sell more than 5,000,000
ounces annually,
2, The silver-producing countries would absorb from their
domestic mine output of silver at least 35,000,000
ounces of silver annually; that the silver so absorbed
would be used either for coinage or currency reserve
purposes or be otherwise retained and kept off the worl I
markets; and that of the total 35,000,000 ounces an-
nually absorbed by these countries the share to be ab-
sorbed by the United States should be at least
24,421,410 ounces per year,^
The President, desiring to give effect to the America i
agreement on silver and acting under the authority conferred up m
him by the Thomas Inflation ^endment to provide for the unlimi ;ed
1, Summarized from the President’s Silver Proclamation of Dec,
21, 1933, the text of which may be found in the New York Times ,
Dec, 28, 1933, p, 2, or the Commercial & Financial Chronicle ,
Dec, 23, 1933, pp, 4441-2,
2, Also summarized from the text of the President’s Silver
Proclamation of Dec, 21, 1933,

95
coinage of silver, directed that
1. The United States mints should receive for coinage into
standard silver dollars any silver mined from natural
deposits in the United States subsequently to the date
of the proclamation.
2. **The Director of the Ldint, v/ith the voliontary consent
of the owner, shall deduct and retain of such silver
so received 50 per cent as seigniorage and for services
performed by the Government of the United States rel-
ative to the coinage and delivery of silver dollars,"
... and that "the 50 per cent of such silver so de-
ducted shall be retained by the Treasury and shall not
be disposed of prior to the thirty-first day of
December, 1937, except for coining into United States
coins. "1
3. The balance of the silver so received, that is, the
remaining 50 per cent thereof, "shall be coined into
standard silver dollars and the same, or an equal
number of other standard silver dollars
,
shall be
delivered to the owner or depositor of such silver. "2
Such, then, was the substance of the silver agreement
reached at the '^orld Economic and Monetary Conference and such
v/as the part of that agreement to be performed by the United
States. The government obligated itself to take at least
24,421,410 ounces of newly mined domestic silver from the pro-
ducers each year for four years and to take such silver at the
statutory price of $1.29 per ounce less a 50 per cent charge for
seigniorage. This meant that the miners vrould receive 64^- cents
an ounce for their silver, and at tliat price the government was
paying 21^ cents above the prevailing market quotation for bar
silver .2 The silverites were naturallj^ much pleased and
1. ^luoted from text of President’s proclamation, q£. cit .
2. Also quoted from text of President’s proclamation, ibid .
3. Figure taken from "Market Surprised by Silver Coinage," The
Uew York Times. Dec. 22
^
1933, pp. 1-2^
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prophesied openly that silver would ultimately reach the stat-
!
utory price of $1*29 an ounce. One of the silver leaders in
,
referring to the new price for the metal made the optimistic
assertion:
”This price will increase the exchange value of the
money of China, India, Mexico, and South -^erican countries
60 per cent in relation to our money. It will increase
the buying power in the United States 50 per cent. There
is no doubt it vrill enormously increase our export trade
to those countries on a silver currency. This, of course,
will tend greatly to hasten our recovery and will hasten
the return of normal conditions.
"Locally it will greatly relieve the mining situa-
tion and will bring happiness to millions depending on
mining."!
The purchase of some 24,421,410 ounces of silver
would mean an annual addition of about $15,500,000 to the cur-
j
i rency. Although this sum was in Itself insignificant when com-
I
pared with our total monetary circulation of over $5,800,000-
000.
2.there was no need at this time of increasing our stock of
money. Any addition to the money supply would, in the absence
of an expansion in business, simply pile up in excess bank re-
serves or return to the Treasury, and, if the new silver cur-
rency were officially forced into circulation when not needed,
'
I
it would drive out of circulation other and better forms of
money. There was, then, no monetary need for more money
whether in the form of silver or otherwise.
In the light of statistics regarding the available
supply of money, it is difficult to understand how even the most
i
1. Hon. Key Pittman, '^Pittman i’redicts sharp iiJxport Kise,^'”Vhe~
I
New York Times , Dec. 22, 1933, p. 1. 1
2. Monthly letter of the National City Bank of New York, January]
r=. il9S4, p* 10* — -Ti
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enthusiastic silverite could argue the necessity for an in-
creased money supply. But the silverite was not so much inter-
ested in the supply of money as in the use of silver as money
and in raising the price of the white metal. The whole thing
smacked of a desire not for doing something in the monetary
interests of the country, but for doing something in the inter-
ests of a particular industry, and that industry was the mining
of silver. Said the Hew York Times editorially;^
"The result will be a small increase of the Amer-
ican money supply, payment to home silver miners of a
price 50 per cent above the market, and the locking up
in the Treasury's vaults of 12,210,000 ounces of idle
silver bullion. The last-named consequence will
duplicate the heaping up of idle bullion under the
famous Silver-Purchase Act of 1890, which made trouble
enough afterward for the Treasury. But the present
plan of the Administration proposes annual 'silver
purchases' during only four years. It does not, like
the statute of 1890, in^pose on the Government yearly^
purchases of 4,500,000 ounces without time limit, and
it does not, as that mischievous legislation did, pro-
vide for purchase by our Government, up to the prescribed
annual sum, of silver from anywhere in the world. On
the other hand, it resembles the law of 1890 in being
an uneconomic experiment, in substance a political 'sop'
to the silver mining states."
These observations were pointed out by the sound
money group who opposed the silver-purchase program, but to the
silver advocates the President's silver proclamation was a
source of gratification. The silverites were pleased with the
outcome of their efforts in behalf of the white metal, but they
were by no means satisfied. It was said by them that the pur-
chase plan was but a step in the right direction ajid that
ultimately silver would be restored to its rightful place in
1. Silver -Pur chase Plan,^ tlie Hew York jimes« iDec. 22. 19gil
2. This is an error, for these were monthly
,
and not yearly,
purchases. See supra, p. 6.
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the monetary system. In fact, plans for the remonetization
of silver at the old ratio of 16 to 1 were prepared, but,
pending the outcome of the purchase plan, they were not for
the moment pressed too strongly.
Other Developments
The silver issue, however, was not for long to re-
^
main unprojected into the foreground of legislative considera-'
j
tion. The events of January, 1934, gave to the silver leaderii
another opportunity, which they could not let pass, for seek-
ing further action on silver. In that month one of the most
I
Important monetary measures ever proposed in our national
history was under consideration. The measure, which subse-
quently became the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, proposed to vest
in the nation the title to all monetary gold stocks within
the country and to empower the President to revalue the gold
dollar at not more than 60 per cent of its existing weight.
To the silver leaders no consideration of such fundamental
changes in the monetary system could be complete without some
provision for silver. And so, when the bill reached the Sen-
ate, several proposed silver amendments were forthcoming.
A remonetization amendment sponsored by Senator
Wheeler was defeated by the close vote of 45 to 43. Said the
New York Times:
’’The administration’s close call on the ’JVheeler
silver amendment in which proponents of buying silver
were defeated by only 45 votes to 43, had come after
Mr. Wheeler amended it to provide that the Secretary
:’
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of the Treasury should be instructed to buy not less
than 25,000,000 ounces of silver in four months and
not less than 10,000 ounces a month thereafter until
a total of 750,000,000 ounces had been bought.
'^The amendment provided that the Secretary of the
Treasury purchase this silver at home or abroad as he
saw fit, and that silver certificates be issued payable
to the bearer in silver bullion at the gold equivalent
value at the time of demand, to the end that silver be
measured by value rather than by weight.
I
ii
'
I
I
I
i
’’The purchase plan would have sought to establish
a ratio of 16 to 1 between gold and silver under the
new monetary policy.
An amendment of lesser importance, offered by Sen-
ator Pittman, was adopted and became part of the Sold Reserve
pAct. In substance the amendment authorized the President:*^
I
I
i
1. To provide for the issue of silver certificates
instead of silver dollars to the tenderer of
silver for coinage.
2. To provide for the issue of silver certificates
against any free silver in the Treasury.
3. To prescribe different terms and conditions for
the coinage of silver of foreign production than
for the coinage of silver of domestic production.
4.
To reduce the weight of the standard silver dollar
in the same nercentage that he reduced tae weight
I
of the gold dollar,
li
'I
5. To regulate the weight of subsidiary coins in such
|! way as to maintain the parity of such coins with
I
the silver dollar and with the gold dollar.
I
Agitation for additional legislation on silver con-
I
I tinned. On ^/arch 19 the Dies bill passed the House. This
ij
!l measure provided for the sale of our surplus agricultural com*
' 1. The New York Times
.
Jan. 28, 1934, p. 2.
,j
2. Sec. 12 of Oold Reserve Act of 1934. For text see the Com-
Ij mercial & Financial Chronicle, Feb. 3, 1934, pp. 743-4, or the
'! wow Yoyk Timea. -Jan. 50. 1954. p ; is. -
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modities abroad and for the acceptance in payment therefore of
silver against which certificates were to be issued. 1 it is
to be noted that the Dies bill passed the House by a vote of
218 to 112 after only two hours of debate and that this action
was taken on the 74th anniversary of the birth of William
Jennings Bryan. 2 Another measure, the Feisinger bill, provided
for the reflation of comniodity prices to the 1926 level
through the purchase by the government of some one and a half
billion ounces of silver. 3 This bill was definitely side-
tracked, however, when the administration made known its op-
position to it.
4
Secretary Morgenthau had already made known his
opposition to the enactment of further legislation on silver
at least for the time being. Moreover, the administration ap-
j
peared to be in doubt as to what action it should take re-
garding the silver issue. Whether to oppose the added pur-
chase of silver or to compromise further with the silver forces
seemed indeed a difficult question. It was admitted that there
were "two schools of thought on silver,'* 3 the one believing
that a higher price for silver would increase our exports to
China and the other that a higher price would curtail China ^s
1. For provisions of the Dies bill see the Commercial & i*'i-
nancial Chronicle
,
March 24, 1934, pp. 2001-2.
2. The Commercial & Financial Chronicle , ibid . , p. 2001.
3. Ibid
.
,
p. 2002.
4. Ibidem
5. Quoted from Secretary Morgenthau ’s announcement of the Roger)$
trip to China. See the Commercial & Financial Chronicle , ibid
p, 2002.
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ability to import goods from abroad. In order to find out
which school was right, it was announced on March 19 by Sec-
retary Morgenthau that Professor James Harvey Rogers, monetary I
adviser to the President, had been ordered to go to China to
|
make a survey of the entire silver situation in the Orient.^ I
I
The announcement of the proposed trip of Professor
|
I
IRogers to China caused some misgivings among the silver leaders
in the Senate. liThy, they protested, should it be necessary for
the President to send a special investigator to China in order
to secure information on the silver situation when there were
so many silver experts in our ovm country, especially among the
members of the Senate? To the silver leaders the whole thing
smacked of an attempt on the part of the administration to de-
lay further action on silver. But, protested Senator King,
“the silver question may not thus be put to sleep. It may be
hypnotized for a brief time but it will not remain silent until
settled completely and settled by legislation that will undo
the wrong that Congress has done to silver.
A
few days later
another of the leading silver champions predicted that the Unites
States would soon be on a bimetallic basis and that Uie increased
use of silver would benefit the peoples of China and the Orient.
One might have thought that the profoimd solicitude of
the Administration and the silver leaders in the Senate for the
1. Secretary Morgenthau* s announcement. See the Commercial &
Chronicle
.
Mar. 24, 1934, p. 2002.
Washington advices of Mar. 19 to the N. Y . Times ; quoted from
the Commercial & Financial Chronicle
,
ibid
.
.
p. 2002.
5. See Pittman statement in the Com. & Fin. Chronicle, ibid..
Dp. 2008-9.
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welfare of the people of China would have been a source of con-
solation to the Chinese people. Such, however, was not the case.
As far back as Dec. 10, 1933, a group of Nanking economic ex-
perts made known their opposition to any policy vrhich v/ould
increase the price of silver. Adoption of any such program, it
was contended, would further v^eaken price levels and increase
the difficulties of the Chinese people.^ Again in February,
1934, a group of Chinese bankers petitioned the Roosevelt ad-
ministration, asking that no action be taken by the American
government which would increase the price of silver. It was
2
Ipointed out that an increased price for silver would cause i
i
commodity price levels in China to fall and thereby affect ad-
j
I
versely the economic situation in China. Again on April 3,
I
1934, Mr. K. C. Li, a Chinese Engineer, in speaking before the
Council on Foreign Relations in Nev/ York, made a similar plea
in which he warned that higher silver prices would not only have
a deflationary effect in China but might, by draining China of
her silver, create a money crisis in which China would be forced
3
'
to abandon the silve. standard.
I
' Meanwhile, purchases by the Treasury of silver at the
I ll
[price of 64^ cents an ounce were proceeding apace. It was |
II
announced by the Treasury Department on Aoril 2 that up to klarchi
!i
130 receipts of silver purchased in accordance v^ith the Presidert'si
I
proclamation of Dec. 21, 1933, amounted to 3,101,677.97 fine ^
T~, The New York Times. Dec. 11. 1933. p. 2.
See the Commercial & Financial Chronicle . Mar. 3, 1934, p 2482
3. See Monthly Letter of the National City Bank of N. Y. for
June 1934, p* 98*
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soon do something more for silver became widespread. In fact,
remonetization v/as regarded as being not unlikely. The silver
market became increasingly active and on April 2 futures were
2higher by 48 to 70 points
.
The Silver Purchase Act
On April 10 the Dies bill, v;hich had already passed
the House, 2 was reported to the Senate by the Senate Committee
on Agriculture. The bill, which provided for the sale of sur-
plus agricultural products abroad and the acceptance of silver
|
above the market price in payment therefor, was approved by
the Senate committee together v/ith two amendments. One of the
amendments, the Thomas amendment, vrould have authorized "the
nationalization of all domestic silver at a price to be fixed
by the Secretary of the Treasury";"^ the other, the '^/heeler,
amendment, would have authorized the purchase of silver in the
|
world markets after January 1, 1935, iii an^ounts of not less
than 50,000,000 ounces per month. Such silver v/as to be paid
I
for with silver certificates, and purchases v;ere to ce^se
when silver should reach $1.29 an ounce in terms of gold or
when the level of commodity prices should reach that which
1. The Commercial & Financial Chronicle
.
Apr. 7. 1934. p. 2340
1
2 . iDid
.
,
p . 2439
. j
3. See supra, p. 99-100.
|
4. v^uoted from the Hew York Times ; see the Commercial ^
Financial Chronicle
.
April 14, 1934, p. 2507.
5. Ibidem.
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prevailed in 1926.
Object ion to the Dies bill and the proposed amendments
thereto was voiced by the Economists’ National Committee on
1
I.'onetary Policy. In a set of resolutions, made public on ^pril
25, it was held by the committee that (1) the acceptance of sil-
ver at a value above the actual market price of the metal in
payment for surplus agricultural products sold abroad would be a
’’subsidy to silver producers” and would add to ’’the heavy Treas-i
ury liability for debased coinage,” and (2) the purchase of
half a billion ounces of silver, as proposed by the Wheeler
amendment, would be an amount sufficient to destroy what little
was left of the American gold standard. The committee declared
its opposition to the enactment of any further legislation on '
silver, holding that additional purchases of silver would not
only not promote recovery, but would ’’add to the liabilities of *
the government” and ’’reduce confidence in the nation’s currency.
The committee pointed out that an increased value for
silver would prove injurious to China and that past experience
had proved that bimetallism would not work. The importance of
these pronouncements lay in the fact that the Economists’ Na-
tional Committee on Ivionetary Policy was composed of ninety
economists of standing, many of whom had for years been con-
sidered the leading monetary experts of the country. Among its
member? were such men as Dr. E. W. Kemmerer, of Princeton Uni-
versity, who had served as a monetary adviser to the governments
1. See the Commercial &Tinancial Chronicle, ^pril 23, 1934,
_pp_# 2844-5
.

Iof thirteen nations, including that of China; Dr. J. I’ranklin
Ehersole, Professor of Finance at Harvard University; Dr. John
T. Holdsv;orth, Dean of the School of Business Administration a1;
the University of IZiami and author of a noted textbook on money
and banking; Dr. Wesley G. Mitchell, the Columbia University
j
authority on business cycles; Dr. William A. Scott, of the UniJ
versity of Wisconsin, a leading textbook writer on money and !
banking; Dr. Oliver M. W. Sprague, of Harvard University, for- !
mer adviser to the Bank of England and later to the United
States Treasury, author of numerous works on money and bank-
ing; and Dr. Ray B. V/esterf ield
,
of Yale University, likewise
an authority and writer on monetary and banking subjects.
Little attention was paid to the objections of the
economists. The silver leaders went right ahead with their
plans for securing, if possible, the enactment of legislation
calling for additional purchases of silver. For a time there
was some doubt as to whether such legislation would meet the
approval of the administration. The silver group conferred
with the President, and, after several meetings over a period
of weeks, a compromise agreement was reached on a new silver
purchase plan. Accordingly, the President on May 2E trans-
mitted to Congress a message in which the new plan was sub-
mitted. His proposals were incorporated into a measure to be
known as the '’Bilver Purchase Act of 1934,” which in substance
• s> •
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included the following:^
!• That it be declared "the policy of the United States"
that the proportion of silver to gold in our mone-
tary stocks should be increased "with the ultimate
objective of having and maintaining one-fourth of
the monetary value of such stocks in silver" (Sec. 2).
2. That the Secretary of the Treasury be authorized
and directed to purchase the silver necessary to
attain that objective (Sec. 3).
3. That the price paid for silver situated in continental
United States on May 1, 1934, should not exceed 50
cents a fine ounce (Sec. 3).
4. That the Secretary of the Treasury be authorized,
with the approval of the President, to sell any
silver acquired under authority of the act, when-
ever the price of silver exceeds its monetary value
or the monetary value of our stocks of silver ex-
ceeds 25 per cent of the monetary value of our
total monetary stocks, provided such sale is in the
public interest (Sec. 4).
5. That the Secretary of the Treasury be authorized
and directed to issue silver certificates in a face
amount not less than the cost of the silver pur-
chased under authority of the act (Sec. 5).
6. That the Secretary of the Treasury be authorized,
with the approval of the President, "to investigate,
regulate or prohibit, by means of licenses or other-
wise, the acquisition, importation, exportation or
transportation of silver and of contracts and other
arrangements made with respect thereto" (Sec. 6).
7. That the President have power to nationalize silver
whenever in his judgment such action is necessary
"to regulate the value of the money of the United
States" (Sec. 7).
1. The text of the proposed leg'^slation may be found in the
New York Times » May 23 , 1934 , p . 2
.
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The President also made known his intention ot seek-
ing wider monetary uses for silver by international agreement.
"At no time since the efforts of this nation to secure interna-
tional agreement on silver began in 1878," said the President,
"have conditions been more favorable for making progress along
this line."l
The administration’s proposed silver purchase bill^
was hailed by some of the silver leaders as the third forward
step in a great program for silver, but among others it could
evoke no enthusiasm. Some of the silver champions complained
that it failed to make silver primary money and that, even if
enacted into law, the status of silver would remain practically
unchanged. It viras admittedly a compromise between the Dies bil
on the one hand, and the measure sponsored by the Senate Com-
mittee on Agriculture, on the other hand. It was reported that
in the viewpoint of the administration, the Dies bill, if en-
acted into law, would not only fail to accomplish what the agri
cultural interests thought it would accomplish, but that it mig|^t
lead to retaliation by foreign nations, while the enactment of
the Senate committee bill, providing for the purchase of 50,000
000 ounces of silver per month, would place the government at
the mercy of the sellers of silver who, by bidding up the price
of silver rapidly, would be in a position to defeat one of the
chief purposes of readjusting a maladjusted currency.
3
'
r
• f
1. The New York Times
,
May 23, 1934, pp. 1-2.
2. For text of bill see the New York Times, ibid., p. 2.
3. Statement of Senator Pittman; see the New ybrk Times, ibid.,
p. 2.
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So much, then, for the nature of the compromise and
the provisions of the proposed legislation. By directing the
j
Secretary of the Treasury to purchase, ”at such rates, at such
I
times and upon such terms and conditions as he may deem reason-
able and i^ost advantageous to the public interest," the silver
necessary to attain the objective set by the act, and by mak-
ing the matter of nationalization permissive with the President,
j'rather than mandatory, a very delicate political situation was
!j
apparently mastered. The silver leaders, however, were assured
ij
that these permissive provisions of the purchase act would be
carried out in good faith and that it would not be lon^r before
I' silver should be nationalized by proclamation of the President,
ji It was estimated that some 1 ,313 ,117 ,GC0^ ounces of
;i
! silver would have to be bought in order to bring the silver
,1
stocks of the Treasury up to the proportion of 1 to 3 with gold
i!
;
and that the cost of this additional silver would total some-
ii 2
!| thing like $2 ,1C0 ,000 ,0C0. Moreover, the acquisition of such
I
'! a vast amount of silver would probably require years, since it
'!
„ greatly exceeded present or probable future supplies for years
to come of silver available for purchase. It is significant to
I
note also that on the basis of the revalued gold dollar, the
3
I weight of the silver dollar remaining unchanged, the acquisi- i
Yl The New York Times, I.'ay ‘ 5, 1934, p. 2.
2 . Ibidem .
j
3. The silver dollar contained 412.5 grains of standard silver
' or 371.25 grains of fine silver. It will be recalled, however,
that the President by authority of the Gold Reserve Act (supra,
Ij p. 99) had the power to change the weight of the silver dollar.
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I
tion of silver to the extent of one-fourth of the value of our
I
i! monetary stocks Vi/ould result in the establishment of a ratio of
l! 1
lj gold to silver of 27 to 1. The new ratio v/ould fall short of
;i
i! the 16 to 1 historic demand of the silverites, but was never-
ii
[
II theless a great gain, since at the time the actual market ratio
I!
2
i
of the two metals was about 75 to 1.
i
A significant development in the public discussion
;
' I
which followed the introduction of the proposed silver purchase!
I
!
legislation occurred in New York on May 31 when a distinguished;
, Chinese banker voiced his opposition to any plan that would in-
I
crease the price of silver. At a luncheon given in his honor
jl by the China Society of America, i/Ir. Li Ming, chairman of the ;
li
II
Bank of China and the Chekiang Industrial Bank, declared that a
i| higher price for silver would not increase China's purchasing
^
power and that he had read "with some amazement" that any such
thing had ever been advocated by friends in America. China's
j
II
purchasing pov/er, he explained, is measured, as in the case of
li
l!
other nations, by her productivity and export capacity and not
I-
li by the value of her silver. He said: I
ll
I
"China does not suffer from low value of silver.
j
Her purchasing power is not measured by the value of the l
silver she possesses, the same as America's purchasing
jpower is not measured by the value of the gold you pos-
|
!
sess.
1, Monthly Letter of the National City Bank of New York, June
; 12)34, p. 93. The President, however, by the Thomas Amendment
I to the Farm Relief Act of 1933 ( supra , p, 92) had the power to
fix any ratio he might desire.
2 . Ib id
.
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"China, like every other country, pays for her
I
imports chiefly by her exports. The silver in her pos-
j
session, no matter how big that amount may be, does
I not help much in her purchases abroad. The theory,
! that by raising the price of silver China would be able
to buy more in America or America would be able to sell i
more to China, is not economically sound. The effect, !
if any, would be very short lived as China could not
long afford to pay for American imports of commodities i
with exports of silver because she needs all the sil-
ver she has for her medium of exchange.”!
On the same day that Mr. Ming delivered this speech
the Silver bill passed the House of Representatives by a vote
of 263 to 77.^ It then went to the Senate where it was debated
!' 2 ,1for several days,^ The old arguments for the coinage of silver!;
' r
|l -that it would increase the supply of money, that it would pro-
j
I
mote business recovery, and that it would stimulate trade with
! the silver-using countries- were offered by the proponents of
I the bill together with a new one, namely, that enactment of
the bill was necessary in order to readjust a maladjusted cur-
' rency. It was argued that the dollar had a purchasing power
I of il.36 and that the increased use of silver would so in-
j
crease the supply of money as to reduce the value of the d ollar
j
II
to 100 cents where it belonged.
The case against the measure was largely one of
denial, the opposition arguing:
I
1. There was no need for broadening the monetary base
i
since we already had the largest supply of monetary
I gold in the world.
I
'I
ll The New York Times. June 1. 1954.
I
£. Ibid .
3. The debate may be found in the Congressional Record
.
73rd
Cong., 2nd Sess., June 6, 7, and 8, 1934.
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2« The resulting loss of confidence in the value of
our money v/ould accentuate, rather than correct,
any maladjustment in the currency.
3. Uncertainty regarding the future value of money
would retard the forces of recovery.
4. It would be necessary to purchase foreign silver
vfith gold in order to attain the objective set by
the act.
5. Trade v;ith China would not be increased since China
was interested in a low, rather than a high, price
for silver.
6. The whole thing v/as simply a subsidy to the producers
of silver.
These arguments, hov/ever, were to be of little avail.
,
The bill passed the Senate on June 11 by a vote of 54 to 25
and on the 19th became a lav/ over the signature of the Presi-
dent.
If the Silver Purchase Act failed to do enough for sil
ver, it could be no fault of the silver group in Congress, for,
while the measure was pending in the Senate
,
the usual amend-
ments were forthcoming. The Thomas amendment requiring the
Treasury to take silver into the monetary stocks on the basis
of its market, rather than its monetary, value was rejected by
a vote of 65 to 17.^ Had this amendment been adopted, it would
have increased substantially the amount of silver to be pur-
chased under the act. Next came the usual free silver amend-
ment providing for remonetization at the old ratio of 16 to 1
2
to be rejected this time by a vote of 59 to 18. “Bvc anendments
however, were adopted: one providing that the tax on silver
1
1
1
i
i.
1
1. See the Conmercical & Financial Chronicle, oune 16. 1934:,
2. Ibid.
*r-
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profits^ apply only to refined silver in bullion form and the
other that silver certificates issued under authority of the
p
act be placed in actual circulation.
The Nationalization of Silver '
The Treasury proceeded immediately to carry out the
provisions of the Silver Purchase r^ct. On June 28 Secretary !
Liorgenthau issued an order olacing an embargo on silver ex-
3
ports except under license. Purchases of silver under author-
ity of the act were soon begun although the amounts acquired
were kept secret. The demand that silver be placed in circula-
tion continued and on August 2 secretary korgenthau promised
the immediate issuance of $50,000,000 in certificates against
free silver in the Treasury. Both the plans and operations of
the Treasury were shrouded with secrecy, but all that was re-
moved on August 9 v/hen the President issued a proclamation
nationalizing silver.
The President’s order"^ required the delivery to
United States mints within ninety days of all silver situated
1. The measure imposed a tax of 50 per cent on profits accruing
from dealings in silver.
2. See the Commercial & Financial Chronicle . June 16, 1934,
p. 4052.
3. The order did not apply to fabricated silver, ore, or for-
eign silver coins.
4. For text of the order see the Nev/ York Times , Aug. 10, 1934,
p. 12, or the Commercial & Financial Chronicle . Aug. 11, 1934,
pp. 858-9.
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in continental United States on Au^st 9, except silver coins;
silver held for industrial, professional, or artistic use;
silver owned by foreign governments or central banks; fabri-
cated silver; silver held under license; and certain other
I
I
minor holdings of silver. The President directed that silver
so delivered to the mints should be coined into standard silver
dollars or otherwise added to the monetary stocks of the United
States and that the owner of such bullion should receive pay-
I
ment therefor in the form of standard silver dollars, silver
certificates, or any other coin or currency of the United States
at the rate of 50.Cl cents per fine troy ounce. The 50.01
cents per fine troy ounce was arrived at by deducting from the
monetary value of the silver (that is, fl.2929 a fine troy
I
ounce) 61 8/25 per cent thereof for seigniorage, brassage,
coinage, and other mint charges.
It will be recalled that Section 3 of the Silver
I
Purchase Act provided that the price paid for silver situated
in continental United States should not exceed 50 cents a fine
ounce. ^ The Treasury explained, however, that the acquisition
of silver under the nationalization proclamation was not a
I
I 2
I
purchase, but a seizure under the right of eminent domain.
The world price of silver was already about 49|- cents an ounce,
and the seizure of accumulated stocks, it was explained by
1. See supra, p. 1C6.
2. The Hew York Times, Aug. 10, 1934, p. 1.
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Treasury officials, was necessary since the Treasury in view
of the 50 cent limitation would soon be unable to acquire
such stocks by purchase.^
Silver trading on the Commodity Exchange was sus-
pended soon after it became known that the President had or-
dered the nationalization of silver. Silver closed at 49.96
2
cents an ounce. Traders in the market had believed for sev-
eral days that important silver developments were forthcoming,
but the exact nature of those developments was, of course, un-
known. The President's proclamation therefore was not with-
' out its surprise element. There was temporary confusion in
the government bond market, and in the foreign exchange mar-
ket foreign currencies advanced against the dollar. The
proclamation was received with varied reactions throughout
the country. By the silver interests it was, of course,
hailed as a great forward step in the development of the na-
I
tion’s monetary program. One of the leading silver champions
in the Senate declared that the nationalization of silver had
I
I
definitely routed the "gold bloc" and that it would pave the
I
•
I
way for a new world monetary standard.*^ Equally enthusiastic
' was the declaration of another leading silverite who hailed
the proclamation as indicating that the Treasury would absorb
surplus silver until the price of the metal reached fl.29 an
ounce at which point other governments would be in a position
1. The New York Times, Aug. 10, 1934, p. 12
2. IbidTTpTl?.
3. Ibid.
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I
to open their mints for the unlimited coinage of silver. ’
"This,” he added, "will settle the silver question forever.”^
In contrast with the optimistic predictions of the
silver leaders was the statement issued by Dr. Ernest M. 1
Patterson, Professor of Economics at the University of Penn-
sylvania. He said that the President’s action had "very lit-
tle, if any, monetary significance," but that it might have
some effect on the price of silver and thereby serve "to pac-
ify the silver crowd.” "Aside from that," he added, "I can-
not see how it will help business much .”2
A similar view was expressed by the New York Times
which had followed consistently the course of legislation on
silver. The Times^ minimized the importance of the national-
ization of silver and added;
"There is no real need for taking the present
step, any more than there v/as for any of the previous
purchases of silver under the new monetary legislation.
No one has benefited except silver producers and
silver speculators. In 1931 the annual silver produc-
tion in the United States was equal in value to 1 per
cent of our national v/heat crop and one-half of our
peanut crop.”
Such, then, was the President’s proclamation and
such were some of the reactions to it. In view of the fact
that our monetary stocks were the largest in our history, it
is difficult to reconcile the nationalization of silver with
the need for more money. It is not difficult, however, to
1. The New York Times , Aug. 10, 1934, p. 12.
2. Ibid .
Zm rbid .^ edi torial page -
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reconcile it vvith the demands of the silver interests. They,
and they alone, as we shall see in the following chapter, were
to benefit from this new action of the government.
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CHAPTER VIII
j
MORE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
I
The Currency Situation
j
The nationalization of silver was followed by the
announcement that the Treasury would proceed to issue im-
, mediately about $80,000,000 in silver certificates against
L
I
62,128,451 ounces of silver acquired prior to the approval of
! the Silver Purchase Act. These certificates were to be issued
on the basis of $1.29 an ounce, the monetary value of silver,
and, since the silver against which they were to be issued
1 had been acquired by the Treasury at an average cost of 75
I
cents^ per ounce, this meant that the difference between
$1.29 and 75 cents, or 54 cents, did not represent real value.
* About fifty-four dollars, then, in every one hundred and
twenty-nine dollars in certificates would represent just so
much flat money. Moreover, the Federal Reserve banks had
i;
agreed to give the new certificates preference over other forms
i|
of money and to use their influence in getting them into actual
circulation.
I It is of little wonder, then, that the administra-
tion's silver policy evoked in many quarters the fear of cur-
jrency Inflation. The dollar continued weak in the foreign ex-
,
change market and on August 14 the first large shipment of
igold abroad since the revaluation of the dollar more than six
.i
1, The New York Times , Aug. 12, 1934, p. 1. See also the edi-
'torTaT pages of the Times for Aug. 12 and 19.
2> The _New_York_T3mi^. Aug^_3j. 1954, d. 1.
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1
months before was arranged. The fact that the Treasury would
permit the exportation of gold abroad, together with the an-
nouncement that certificates issued against silver to be ac-
quired under the Purchase Act would be issued on the basis of
the actual cost of the metal, rather than on the basis of the
monetary value of silver, served for a brief time to allay
fears of currency inflation.
Certificates issued against the silver acquired prior
to the approval of the Purchase Act soon found their way into
2
circulation. On August 17 it was disclosed that during the
first full week of operation under the new policy some
$11,476,508 in certificates had left the Treasury. It was an-
nounced also that during the same period there had been a
substantial Increase in certificates outstanding, that the
Treasury’s stock of silver bullion had increased some tenfold
from $2,484,700 to $24,915,518, and tiat the "profit” or
i
"seigniorage" on the Treasury's purchases, that is, the dif-
ference between the cost of the metal and its statutory or
mint value of $1.29 an ounce, had amounted to $12,189,319.
The Treasury continued with vigor to acquire silver
under the Purchase Act and to place certificates issued against
silver previously acquired into actual circulation. By the
end of August more than $53,000,000 in new certificates had
3
been pumped into circulation. These certificates, a portion
1. The Providence Evening Bulletin
.
Aug. 14, 1934.
2. The Providence Evening Bulletin
.
Aug. 18, 1934.
3. The Providence News-Tribune. Aug. 27, 1934.
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of which represented fiat money, were, of course, an unsound
element in the currency, and it was said that, aside from a
slight increase of 000, 000 in our monetary circulation, they
had displaced other forms of money.
Treasury nurchases of silver abrce, d together v;ith
wide“spread rumors that the President would further devalue the
dollar caused considerable uncertainty regarding the future of
our currency. The dollar fell below the gold export point^
and for a time it looked as though gold would have to be
shipped abroad. There was some talk also as to whether our
government would use gold with which to purchase the silver
necessary to bring our stocks up to the 1 to 3 ratio set by
the Silver Purchase Act. In some quarters it was held that
the use of gold to purchase foreign silver would do much to
bring about a redistribution of monetary gold stocks, .uiy
such scheme, however, would be a costly one for the United
States. 7e were already purchasing at artificially high prices
silver which we did not need and to use gold to acquire for-
eign silver to pile even higher the hoard of idle silver in
the vaults of the Treasury would appear to be the height of
folly.
^
The Protest from China
It was not long before our silver policy brought
forth a protest from China. The rise in the world price of
119
1. See the New York Times for August 23 and 29, 1934.
2, For a discussion of possibilities in this direction see
"Buying Silver with Cold," an editorial in the New York Times
far Aug, SSy 1054.
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silver since the beginning of the year had led to the with-
i
idrawal of a large amount of the white metal from China. On
|i
jl September 9 Lir. Li Ming, dean of Chinese bankers, who v/as
l|
il in America to study the silver policy of our government and
||
. to ascertain its probable effects on the Chinese situation,
li
' made public a statement^ in which he expressed the opinion
ji
;
that China could not afford to lose much more silver and
i that, if the export movement continued, the Chinese Govern-
{;
ment would find it necessary to declare an embargo or to
;1 levy a high tax on the export of silver. Mr. Ming, whom we
|i 2
!l
have referred to above, reiterated the fact that China was
!| interested in a lov/, rather than a high, price for silver
I
j
and explained that the rising price of silver induced by
I
the policies of our government was having a deflationary
,j
effect on China ^s internal price levels and was rapidly
f!
i| draining the country of the silver needed to serve as a
medium of exchange.
jl
j|
On September 27 an official protest from the
,i
Nanking Government against our silver policy was delivered
" to the State Department by Dr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, the Chinese
[
Minister. This was the first formal communication between
I
the two governments on the subject although it was disclosed
later that the Chinese position had been outlined previously
i' 1. See the New York Times, Sept. 9, 1934, Pin. Sec., p. 1.
i;
|j
2. Supra
, pp. 109-10.
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in a series of telegrams,^ The following excerpts from these
notes and telegrams show clearly the basis for China »s pro-
test to the American Government:
!• China ratified the London Silver Agreement of
July, 1933, with the understanding that the
agreement was "designed primarily to assure
the stability of the price of silver, which
was deemed to be menaced by the holdings of
large surplus stocks on the part of the gov-
ernment of Spain and the Indian Government.”^
2. Under the Silver Purchase Act it appeared "that
the interests of China and the stability of the
price of silver were menaced as much as they
were by the previous situation of potential
sellers.
3. China’s currency was flowing out of the country
"to a degree that was potentially alarming.”^
4. The rising price of silver had involved "severe
deflation and economic losses to China" and had
"dislocated China’s balance of payments, in
part at least, by hampering exports."^
5. By discouraging the export of commodities the
rise in the price of silver was impairing
"China’s purchasing power for imports."®
1. The contents of these telegrams were published in the
New York Times for Oct, 17, 1934, pp. 31 and 35,
2. Communication of Finance Minister H. A. Kung to Mr. Edwin
S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, on Aug.
20. See the New York Times , ibid . , p. 31.
3. Ibid ..p, 31,
4. Ibid .
5. Telegram of Dr. Kung to Secretary of State Hxill on Septem-
ber 24. See the New York Times
,
ibid
.
,
p. 35.
6. Dr. Kung’s formal protest of October 2 to Secretary of
State Hull. See the New York Times , Oct. 15, 1934, p. 4.

i!
It was knovm definitely that large quantities
i of Chinese silver were being prepared for shipment abroad.
1
I
The withdrav/al of this silver was not only creating a mon-
I etary crisis, but was causing China's price levels to fall
I
rapidly and v/as curtailing her purchasing power in inter-
I
. national trade. The Nev/ York Times for October 16 reported
I
•' that the average for China's commodity prices, which stood
I t
Ij
at 126.7 in 1931, had fallen to 99.8 and that China's im-
|
ports for the first eight months of 1934 amounted in value !
ij
to 718,000,000 Chinese dollars as compared v;ith 975,000,000 '
|| j
for the same period in 1933.2 “it is curtailment of trade
j
li
j
i
and deflation of values," said the Times . "not prosperity, i
j
:
that has overspread the Yangtse Valley. "2
|
I i
The purpose of China's protests was not only to
|
appraise the American Government of the Chinese situation
!
i but to ascertain, if possible, to what extent we expected
I
to carry our purchases of silver. In his note of October
I
2 to Secretary of State Hull, China's Finance Minister in-
quired:
' 1. See the Commercial & Financial Chronicle . Oct. 20, 1934,
j
p. 2436. On October 14 it was reported that $20,000,000 :
' in Chinese money was being prepared for shipment to america :
I
and London and that consignments for shipment abroad were in-
j
Ij
creasing daily.
'i
I
2. p. 16.
I
I
j
3. Ibid .
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"Could not the American Government for
present restrict its purchases to silver already
in America to avoid further promoting the drain
from China?"
1
Secretary Hull, in his answer to this inquiry,
explained that the American program of silver purchases was
made mandatory by act of Congress, but that, in carrying
out that program, the American Government would so arrange
its future purchases of silver as to "keep in viev; the con-
siderations" put forward by the Chinese Government .2 v/ith
reference to China’s inauiry as to whether we would be
willing to exchange some of our gold for silver in the event
that China abandoned the silver standard for a gold basis.
Secretary Hull replied that no such exchange had been con- '
templated by our government since gold could be acquired
by purchase in the world markets, but that we might at
some future time be willing "to explore” the possibilities
of such an exchange with representatives of the Chinese
Government*
5
This reply of the American Government, while ex-
pressing some measure of concern for the difficulties in
which China found herself, failed to satisfy the Chinese.
China responded on October 14 by imposing a 10 per cent
tax on the export of silver in an effort to conserve and
protect her currency.
!
1. The New York Times, Oct. 15, 1934, p.4
2. Ibid.
3. TFn.
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Such was China’s predicament I We were confronted
j
with the unusual spectacle in international relationships
I' of one nation deliberately pursuing a policy which was up-
r I
:{ setting the internal economic life of another for which
ll
it had always professed a high degree of friendship. To
I
^ those friends of the white metal who for so many years had
Ij expressed such profound solicitude for the welfare of China
ii
the whole affair must have been indeed humiliating. All of
their optimistic hopes and predictions about restoring "the
\\
Ij
I
purchasing povtrer of the Orient" turned out to be wrong.
I
I!
h
II
!!
f
I
'I
I
Situation at End of the Year
The efforts of China to stem the outflow of sil-
ver appeared at first to meet with some success, but, as
the end of the year 1934 approached, the Chinese situation
became progressively worse. The country continued to be
slowly drained of its currency and as the efflux of silver
continued the forces of deflation gained momentum. 1 In
December Chinese banks were subjected to considerable strain
on account of the withdrawal of large amounts of silver for
hoarding and for export abroad. An acute economic situa-
tion in China, the result of drought conditions in some
sections, of winter conditions in others, and of the dep-
redations of outlav/s in others, was accentuated by the
1
1
1. For a description of the situation see the New York
Time
s
,
Dec. 9, 1934, Financial Section, pp. 7 aria”!!;
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"national economic distress" and monetary crisis resulting
from the rising price of silver.^
Another country to be greatly affected by our sil-
ver policy was Mexico . At first Mexico was to benefit fran
the rising price of silver but later was to experience a
monetary crisis similar in many ways to that of China.
2
Mexico, unlike China, produces silver for export, and con-
sequently was in a position to profit from the higher
price for silver. Moreover, it was reported on October
29 that Mexico was selling newly mined silver directly to
the United States Treasury.3 The terms and conditions on
v/hich this silver v/as sold to the Treasury were not dis-
closed, but it v^as known that, as a result of the sale,
the Mexican Government had acquired dollar balances in the
United States.
In the announcement in v/hich the purchases from
Mexico v/ere disclosed the Treasury indicated that by the
end of October the silver acquired under the nationaliza-
tion order had reached 98,088,937 ounces."^ Moreover, it
was disclosed also that nev/ silver dollars—the first
1
1
1
i
1. A vivid description of distressing economic conditions
in China is .f?iven in the new York Times, Dec. 31, 1934,
p. 15.
2. See infra, o. 136.
3. The New York Times, Oct. 30, 1934, o. 27.
4. Ibid.
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since 1923—were being minted from nationalized silver.^
The Treasury reported on October 20 that approximately
53,000 new silver dollars had been minted at Philadelphia,
These dollars were soon Placed in circulation and in Dec-
ember the shiny ’’cartwheels” appeared in New York where,
it was reported, they were ’’sufficiently uncommon in the
financial district to attract attention.”^
At the close of the year it was unofficially es-
timated that the Treasury’s holdings of silver were slight-
ly in excess of 1,000,000,000 ounces. 3 These holdings, it
was said, were about 1,000,000,000 ounces short of the
amount needed to bring our reserves of silver up to the
one-to-three ratie with gold as set by the Silver Purchase
Act.‘ At the same time it was disclosed^ that Treasury
purchases of newly mined silver were short by 3,662,410
ounces of the quantity our government had agreed to take
off the market during the first year of operation under
the London Silver xtgreement. It was held by Treasury ex-
perts that the failure of the government to acquir e the
amount of silver agreed upon was due to the low output of
domestic mines, although in some quarters it was held that
the miners were withholding part of their production in the
1. The New York American
.
Oct, 21, 1934,
2. The New York Times
.
Dec. 21, 1934, p, 37,
3. The New York Times
.
Dec. 25, 1934, p. 33,
4. I'bid ,
5. Ibid,
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hope of profiting later from a still higher price for sil-
;ver
.
A significant end-of-the-year commentary on our
silver policy was the vote taken by the Economists' Na-
tional Committee on Monetary Policy which showed that 98
per cent of the ninety five members of that organization,
gathered in Chicago for tlie annual meeting of the American
Economic Association, opposed any further purchases of sil-
ver by the government. 1 The members of this committee, as
j
pointed out above, 2 included the leading monetary experts
of the country. But it made little difference v/ho opposed 1
the government's silver purchase policy; the purchases were
continued. Silver, which was quoted in the Nev; York open
:aarket on May 1, 1934, at 41-;^ cents an ounce, had reached
55-4 cents on November 13, the high for 1934, and on Jan-
uary 3, 1935, was quoted at 54 7/8 cents an ounce. 2
Further Plans for Silver
At the beginning of 1935 tine Treasury speeded up
its purchases of silver. In so doing, it v;as, of course,
seeking to bring our silver reserves nearer the goal set
by Congress in the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, but to an
impartial observer it is very difficult to understand how
1
!
1. See the Commercial & Financial Ci'U’onicle. Dec. 29, 1934,
p. 4052.
2. See supra, no. 104-5.
3. The New York Tinies. Jan. 4, 1935, n. 37.
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or wherein this silver purchase program of the government
had helped, or would help, anybody except, of course, the
producers of silver. The carrying out of this program had,
as we have seen, disrupted the internal economic life of
China for whose benefit it was in part designed; it had
resulted in drastic curtailment of China’s ability to buy
American or other foreign made goods; it had led to the
acouisltion of a vast amount of useless silver to be
stored in the vaults of the Treasury, although some of this
silver had been pumped into circulation at the expense of
other and better forms of money; it had complicated and
intensified the monetary problem at home; and had filled
the hearts of the currency tinkerers and cheap money ad-
vocates with renewed hope. While our silver purchases may
have increased to some small extent the amount of available
credit, that credit was neither used nor needed. And if
there had been any progress in business recovery, it was in
spite of the silver policy of the government and not be-
cause of it. It had been predicted freely that silver was
the magic key to recovery, but probably the champions of
the white metal were no more right about this than they
were about increasing "the purchasing power" of China.
It must not be thought, however, that our sil-
ver policy was a complete failure. It had succeeded, as
we have seen, in raising the world price of silver and in
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appeasing in some degree the champions of silver. But it
is not to be supposed that the silver interests were satis-
jj
fied; far from it. Plans, both old ones and new ones, for
doing more for silver were kept in the foreground and at
I
times were pushed with considerable vigor. In January sev-
eral silver proposals appeared in the House of Representa-
,
tives, ranging all the way from the establishment of a bi-
'! 1
j
metallic to a silver standard. Outright remonetization
i;
was again talked of in the Senate and later when the pro-
posed $4,800,000,000 Work Relief Bill reached that body
I
' a four-point silver amendment was attached to it. The
^
amendment, which would have made mandatory the issue of
i silver, required the Treasury to keep silver in circula-
i
tion, authorized the exchange of gold for silver and the
i acceptance of silver in international balances, was, after
il 2
i: a threatened filibuster, finally dropped,
I
:i
;
What about Gold?
II
ji During the course of these numerous developments
I
In the government’s silver program, little was heard about
ij
j;
gold. Figures made available recently show that the out-
look regarding the adequacy of the future supply of mone-
I' tary gold is even brighter than was pictured in Chapter IV,
' In an article published in the New York Times for April 21,
Il 1. See the New York Times , Jan, 4, 1935, p, 17,
' 2, The New York 1*11116 3 , Mar. 23, 1935, pp. 1-2. See also the
I
Times J^or Mar, 2^, 1935, p. 1,

1935, Mr. E. V. Bell shows that even allowing for the
marking up of the dollar value of gold by the revaluation
proclamation ’’the current total of monetary gold stocks
is far higher than was ever seen in former years and the
holdings of leading governments and central banks are at
record highs.” Gold production has been increased tre-
mendously as a result of the depression and this increase
in supply has in effect been further increased by the
process of revaluation. Figures from Federal Reserve
bulletins show that of the fourteen leading gold countries
all, except three, had far larger stocks of monetary gold
in 1934 than in 1929 and that of the three exceptions
2
Argentina’s supply was about the same. Moreover, it is
3
now reported that within two years gold production in
Soviet Russia will exceed even that of the Transvaal in
South Africa.
The most encouraging aspect of the gold situation
is not the figures, which speak for themselves, but the fact
that the ’’New Deal” government in Washington has admitted
the adequacy of our supply of monetary gold. On March 20
our government sold 32,000 ounces of gold valued at
|1, 120, 000 to Mexico in exchange for silver. Moreover, it
1. Sec. IV, p. 10.
2. Ibid. The other two nations were Germany and Japan.
3.
The ^ew York Times
,
June 6, 1935, p. 4
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v»as at the ssme time revealed that we had entered into a
similar transaction involving some 10,000 ounces with
Gruatemala the preceding Decemher. It was stated hy Sec-
retary oi the Treasury Morgenthau that we had ’’All the
gold we can possibly use” and that the United States was
prepared to swap gold ior silver with toreign countries
that could otter an attractive exchange proposition to
2
our government.
A very signiticant statement came on March 6
trom Mr. Marriner S. 3ccles, Governor ot me Federal Re-
serve Board. In his testimony beiore the House Banking
and Ourrency Committee on the proposed banxing bill ot
iyii)£>, the Reserve Board Governor stated that in his opin-
ion the depression had not been caused by any lack ot
money nor was the nation’s ability to tight the depression
id
a question ot money. This admission must have been in-
deed disappointing to those champions ot silver, who,
throughout the depression, had argued that the world-wide
collapse was the result ot a shortage in the supply ot
money. The Reserve Board Governor's statement was the more
signiticant not because it a ppeared to be based on sound
economics but because it came from one so prominent in the
counsels ot the government.
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The Bew Price for Silver
Od April 10 President Roosevelt by proclamation
raised the price which the Treasury would pay for newly
mined silver from the 64^ cent level which had prevailed
since December 21, 1955, to 71 cents an ounce. ^ It was
believed that this action was induced by reason of the fact
that silver in the world market had reached a price of
64 l/S cents an ounce. When the Treasury began its pur-
chases of silver at 64|- cents an ounce, the world price of
the metal, it will be recalled, was slightly more than
42 cents. 2 i^s a result of the purchase program of the
government, the price of silver had been forced gradually
upward until on April 1C it was within a fraction of the
official buying price of the government. At that point
it became necessary for the government to raise its pur-
chase price if it was to maintain its own position as a
buyer of the metal. By establishing a price of 71 cents
an ounce the government out its seigniorage on the metal
from 50 to 45 per cent.
The establishment of the new purchase price by
the government was interpreted as indicating that the gov-
I
ernment intended to carry forward without delay its pro-
gram of building up our reserves of silver to the one-to-
three ratio to gold. The silver interests were, of course,
1. oee the Bew York 'limes, April 11, 195£>, pp. 1 and
2. See supra
,
p. 95.
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;! pleased, but they were not so pleased that they were satis-
I
fied. Immediately another crop of silver bills v/as forth-
;! coming in Congress and in the Senate the Comraittee on
iigricnltare gave its approval forthwith to the Vi/heeler
16 to 1 silver purchase bill which was designed to farther
|i
jj
inflate the currency cind to speed Lhe attainment of the
i! 1 to 3 ratio. From a purely monetary standpoint the ac-
||
ii quisition of any more silver was unnecessary, and, in
!j
commenting on the situation, the hew York Times said:
I
'^Certainly there was never a time v/hen
the claim that v/e 'need' silver in order to
'broaden our monetary base' was more absurd
on its face. Devaluation of the dollar has
automatically increased our gold reserves,
I
when these are measured in terms of dollars,
I
and expended our already large stock to a
point far more ample for our needs . The
Treasury now holds $8,600,000,000 in gold.
With a gold coverage of 40 per cent this is
enough to support $21,500,000,000 in currency.
That is more than four times the amount of
! currency of all kinds outstaiiding at the peak
j|
of the boom in i929.
j!
"Nor have the tireless champions of sil-
li ver any reason to complain that the Government
|l has been indifferent to the price which their
I beloved metal brings . At one time in 1932
I
silver sold for 24
.%. cents an ounce. Last
!
week it sold for 64. An increase of more than
150 per cent within three years ought to satis-
I
fy even the most learned of the Senate's mone-
tary experts . "2
The world price of silver continued to rise and
soon passed the government's nev/ly established purchase
j
1. Ansonia Evening Sentinel
,
April 11, 1935, p. 1.
!
I
2. April 15, 1935, p. IS.
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pricje, For the same reasons, then, whioh called forth the
proclamation of April 10 President Roosevelt on April 24
issued another proclamation raising the government’s pur-
chase price for newly mined silver to 77.57 cents an
ounce. 1 This second proclamation came somewhat as a sur-
prise since it had been intimated earlier at the Treasury
that newly mined silver might be purchased, for the time
being at least, at the market price. ^ The new price cut
the government's seigniorage to 4C per cent and it was in-
I
terpreted as further evidence of the determination of the
government to accumulate silver at a faster rate.
The new proclamation was hailed with enthusiasm
by the silver interests and by speculators abroad who were
profiting from the rising price of silver. On the day dol-
lowing the issuance of the proclamation the world price of
silver in the open market went up 5 2/8 cents an ounce.
^
This brought silver to the highest price since 1920. Sil-
ver stocks were actively traded in Kew York and rose one
to five points.'^ The price of silver continued upward
and on April 26 it reached 81 cents, or 4 cents above the
official government price for the newly mined metal.
^
1. The Kew York Times
,
April 25, 1925, pp. 1 and 2.
2. Ibid
. ,
p. 1.
j
2. The Mew York Times
,
April 28, 1925, sec.mi, p. 1.
I
5. The Mew York Times
,
April 27, 1925, p. 2.
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Foreign Complications
For a time it appeared that the government might
again raise the purchase price for silver, but, as the world
price receded to a point just below the government's figure,
no further action v/as forthcoming and no further action
probably would have been forthcoming unless the world price
had remained above the government’s official quotation. As
it was, the whole affair had worked out to the complete
satisfaction of the government.
The higher price of silver may have been a source
of joy to the miners and the speculators but it was to lead
to serious complications abroad, China protested immediately,^
pointing out that the increased price for silver would fur-
ther stimulate the forces of deflation and intensify the al-
ready serious monetary crisis confronting that coxantry. Dr,
2
Alfred Sze, the Chinese Minister, informed the State Depart-
ment that our silver policy, was creating in China a situation
similar to that which prevailed in the United States in 1933,
It was said that the Chinese Government felt practically
helpless in the matter since its efforts to stem the outflow
of currency had proved ineffective. Speculators in silver
were smuggling the metal out of China in spite of the export
restrictions,
1, The New York Times Apr, 26, 1935, p, 2,
2. Ibid,
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Another country which felt the effe^.ts of a rising
price for silver was Mexico. For two years a stable relation-
ship had been maintained between the Mexican peso and the
American dollar, but that relationship was completely dis-
rupted when the price of silver reached 77 cents an ounce.
^
"With silver at that price," said the New York Times in de-
scribing the situation, "the intrinsic worth of the silver peso
had become nearly 30 cents, against a coin value of only
27.90 cents."^ Here, then, was a situation in which Mexico ^
was faced with the possible melting down of the peso for ex-
port abroad as silver bullion. A collapse of the currency
system 7/as threatened and for a time the monetary cutlook
in Mexico was indeed uncertain.'^
The Mexican Governraent moved quickly to meet the
situation: banks were closed immediately and an embargo was
placed on the export of silver. The government directed that
silver coins be turned in at the Bank of Mexico in exchange
for paper certificates to be issued against the silver so
acquired. Moreover, it was made knov/n that plans were made
for the minting of new bronze 20 cent pieces, and, on April
28, it was announced that these new coins were being placed
!
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1. The New York Times, Apr. 26, 1935, p. 2.
2. Ibid.
3. For a description of the Mexican crisis and the way in which
it was handled see the New York Times, Apr. 26, 1935, p. 2;
April 28, 1935, Sec. IV., p. 8; April 29, 1935, pp. 1 and 4;
and April 30, 1935, p. 16.
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in circulation.!
Mexico took her complaint directly to the American
Government. Since Mexico was a producer of silver, she i
stood to benefit from a high price for the metal. Her govern-
ment, of course, was cognizant of this fact. What it opposed
was not a high price for silver but a price which rose so
rapidly as to disrupt the currency. A representative of the
I
Mexican Governraent was sent to Washington to discuss the
situation with the United States Treasury, and, after a series
of conversations between representatives of the two govern-
I
ments, it was announced that a "mutually satisfactory" under-
standing had been reached on the silver-purchase program of
our government. 2 Since the exact nature of this understanding
was not disclosed, there was considerable speculation as to
whether the government intended to slow down its purchases
of silver or to exchange more gold for Mexican silver. What-
j
ever the nature of the understanding the fact remains that ||
I
I
the Mexican banks were soon reopened and quiet was again re-
|
stored in the silver market South of the Rio Grande. '
I
The expeditious settlement of the Mexican problem is
|
in striking contrast to the vainly presented protests from
China. China, to be sure, had gotten a hearing, but had re-
I
ceived little or no satisfaction. She apparently was to be
1. The New York Times
,
Apr. 1935, p.4.
2. The New York Times
,
Apr, 30, 1935, pp.l and 31.
r/ Y^TTcj'^lD ^rxiel'jr.oO -lo:! 'i’-oj- onixa-^c
/.Cxs Ic aeojL/iJO-iq ^p. roivj:.v .w^c.ru^
ificvo^ 'len .j.iJ'&£:T tJiv •*e'i -fcivT riul/' - mc‘i'1 ^iicr.z-^ •,;;
.b6p;o-/<iO '^.iil:}’ 'i-: ii.n;^iCo 'icvf . joo 'lo
cc eecT i:: irfvv e‘: l'iv a -tXiXi -leViXa ac.: ^cl'ic/ r .1 ' ^
be ovIcJ «Jr-P ‘i;©'! J,
.
^DiJC'i-L.'. o sr.b cl-qx'*' 5
-^i
&n.: c f ;: • C‘ ^ f xl. drri-ie'rc-O i-Ji
el"r©3 » ‘ift'ir- ..'rn-i
,
.• • fji.-t rktlf n., iv
O'rS fr. < ‘-O C V 1 .1 e'' - c- - ;•©£’' •I'CJ 3:1P a. J'liiVI&'/r
-••:f’'ijnjLr ’^v/iojoeleiJ /i.lAu^un' ** :f . xei.r.ij .n.xic ij'^.v; ,
'xo
;
ti:Di D'LiS':.-'rc\ xlz e-ir iio i..^, ,ip> e-j n©cn bx', q.J
a-x&brxL' r.i/ur .:c e-'iL-.i .. ' - : > .jfr:;Mri6vc
ci EP . .C-.V -'"i- 0©Jri P_CfS"TJbLX-Hr’‘^'P- u -'.V t‘ S';.' .O iiOxCCiC * C
aes Gd'.- LlVh l. ''^old od bCi-f Cdri.v J::;;..U;-:cVO.;- !-..Ct -Is
-::..*'(Yi i. vj.x.. nx^Gri:v‘..i ': &'ion e .nGbc.xe oj '"o 'lovJ
^.axld- drii'x frf,. . 3^1- -tix; frj e^j*o.^n Cx:.
-L*': £iiv> -fc.' sp v w-^e-jjdp biis: be/i©..c©‘:i ii.cg c ilu e>..uc nxjciix;
.Obr G-'lO fc ': j b. ' ; jX/O^ r ©>:'! 8.II Ci'X 11 J. 1
i XjSo j; Vf'.: ebd *c d’ntnie X d’d oa rijjoJcrirGcrs erlT
iTrc‘'-'i
-•^.d Ged’O'xq j:)h-d'£i6e a-/-:: ('-i: jb?v c-dd ei
jc>ixl txfb . .^.I'TXied ^ rredJtp ^»i£ -
,
f.-ixr:: ed od , Pr /:
e\: 0-1 Si*.v- ijr.fdrr;-: 3f:r 8 ©.d.G . iiP'i:! ceiLi.d.G3 c;t ic oXud/I i
as:OO',- J
I!
I
138
left to cope with, her problems as best she could,
China and Mexico were not the only nations to
experience adverse effects from the rising price of silver
induced by the American purchase program. Monetary crises
1 2
were precipitated in Nicaragua, Peru, and other Latin and
I
I
South American countries, where silver coins came to have
greater value as bullion than as money. These countries
were forced to issue new paper money in place of silver
coins and to place embargoes on the export of silver.
Even in Austria and Italy restrictions were placed on the
export of silver in order to prevent the wholesale ex-
portation of silver coins,
^
Such were some of the results of the rising price
of silver. The American Government seemed sinxious to push
up the -price of silver regardless of whom it harmed or in-
jured. For one nation deliberately to pursue a policy which
needlessly upset the internal concerns of other countries
was indeed unusual in international relationships, but such
was the case in the silver purchase program of the American
Government
,
1, See the New York Times
,
May 18, 1935, p, 16.
2, See the New York Times for May 4, 1935, p, 5, and May 6,
1 1935, p, 12,
3, For a brief account of the Austrian and Italian situa-
tions see the New York Times
,
May 15, 1935, p. 5,
1

The Present Situation
On June 11, 1935, it was revealed by Secretary
Morgenthau^ that during the ten month period ending May 31
the government had acquired a total of 421,497,000 ounces
2 3
of silver, or, as the New York Times pointed out, more
than 13,000 tons of the white metal* This amount, the
Secretary indicated, exceeded by 2.7 times the total
world production for the same period, by 16*4 times our
domestic production in the same period, by more than 20
times the amo\mt we agreed to take off the market under
the London Agreement during the same period, by 44 times
the amount that all other parties to the London Agreement
had agreed to take off the market in a whole year, and by
2-|- times the amount the Treasury purchased under the
Sherman Act of 1890* We had been acquiring silver at a
very rapid rate but just what good it was to do us was
I
I
not disclosed.
"Claims were made,” said the Times
,
"when the
whole question was under debate in Congress a year ago,
that if our reserves of silver were maintained in a ratio i
of one to three with our reserves of gold, ’money in
1. Letter to Senator McCarran. Por text see the New York
I
Times
,
June 12, 1935, p. 10. i
! 2. The distribution was 283,000,000 ounces by purchase,
|
i 112,850,000 under the nationalization order, and 25,647,000 |i
from newly mined domestic silver.
3. June 13, 1935, p. 22. |l
4

circulation* would increase rapidly, commodity prices
would soar, the silver mining industry would boom and
commerce with China would prosper. But ’money in cir-
culation* is today only fractionally higher than ten
months ago; with the exception of farm products, most
groups of commodities are lower; domestic production of
silver is about 50 per cent below the pre-depression
level, and Chinese trade is in the dumps.
pMoreover, it was pointed out that during the
same ten month period our monetary gold stocks had risen
about $1,000,000,000, thus increasing by some 258,297,932
ounces the silver to be purchased under the policy laid
down by Congress. It was said^ that the Treasury still
had at least 1,145,000,000 ounces of silver to buy be-
fore our reserves of silver would reach the 1 to 3
ratio with gold. Of course, the silver leaders might
argue that their predictions about the magic powers of
the white metal might still come true if and when our
silver reserves were actually built up to the 1 to 3
ratio, but by the time the Treasury finds it possible to
acquire more than a billion ounces of silver, the de-
pression might be all over.
1. June 13, 1935, p. 22.
2. The New York Times
,
ibid
. , p. 33.
3. Ibid.
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The silver purchase program of the government
has caused the world price of silver to rise by more than
60 per cent* It is now in the neighborhood of 73 cents,
but the silver leaders will probably never be satisfied
until it reaches ;^1.29 an ounce. No one, so far as can
be determined, has benefited from the rise in silver
except the producers of silver and the speculators. When
it is considered that more than 80 per cent of the silver
produced in our country comes not from straight ores,
but is obtained as a by-product from the production of
copper, lead, zinc, and other ores,^ and when it is con-
sidered that the value of the silver output of the United
States in 1931 was worth less than $9,000,000 or about
1 per cent of the value of the national wheat crop or
Q
^ that of the peanut crop, it can be seen that the
silver interests in America are a minority group. Pro-
fessor Kemmerer has pointed out that the seven silver
states, which in 1931 produced about 95 per cent of our
entire silver output, contained less than 3 per cent of
our entire continental population. Certainly these
minority interests have just cause to be thankful that
there is in Washington a kind and generous government
1. The New York Times
,
Dec. E9, 1934, p. 14.
2. Kemmerer on Money
,
op . cit .
,
p. 115.
3. Ibid.
r
1
which has singled out the white metal for its special
protection. No attempt at prophecy is made here, but
it may be said by way of conclusion that if history
repeats itself the Santa Claus government in V^ashington
may at some future time do even more for silver.
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CHAPTER IX
SUMvIARY AND CONCLUSION
I
j
With the close of the preceding chapter our study
|
of ’’Recent Developments in the Movement to Remonetize Silver”
was brought down to June of 1935. It is a far cry from the
beginnings of the silver movement shortly after 1873, but
the echoes of that cry are still heard in America today.
We began in Chapter I with a brief summary of the background
and beginnings of the silver movement and have traced the
outstanding developments in silver down through the war
and post-war periods to the present depression. Our study
of these developments has been both historical and analyt-
ical. An attempt has been made not only to record important
happenings, but to investigate the background of those
happenings, to interpret them, and to analyze them from
the standpoint of their ultimate monetary significance.
With the election of 1896 and the subseq.uent adop-
tion of the gold standard the silver issue was settled for
the time being. During the opening years of the Century
little or nothing was heard from the champions of silver,
who, a few short years earlier, were preaching the doctrines
of more money, rising prices, and doing something for sil-
ver. Even in the study of the currency system which pre-
ceded the passage of the Federal Reserve Act the question
of silver remained far in the background.
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During the war period, hov/ever, the silver issue
was again forced to the front. The exigencies of the war
created an abnormal demand for silver with the result that
the price of the metal skyrocketed to $1.38 an ounce. Here
was an admirable opportunity to dispose of the vast hoard
of idle silver in the vaults of the Treasury at a price far
in excess of the cost of the metal to the government. It
was a chance not only to profit from the sale of the metal
,
but in addition to rid the currency of the inelastic silver
dollar.
Congress saw the opportunity to dispose of the sil-
ver dollar but did not take advantage of it. It was willing
in the Pittman Act to provide for the breaking up and melting
i
down of silver dollars to meet a war-time emergency, but the
silver leaders in Congress saw to it that after the emergen-
cy had passed every dollar’s worth of silver so broken up
!
and melted down was repurchased and recoined into standard
silver dollars. Thus Congress failed to avail itself of an
opportunity to improve the currency, and the inelastic sil-
ver dollar which did not and could not be made to circulate
remained an anomaly in the monetary system,
j
After the war the price of silver, like other
i prices, declined but that decline was undoubtedly retarded
by the action of the government in purchasing silver in
accordance with the provisions of the Pittman Act. From the
high point of $1.38 an ounce reached in 1919 silver fell to
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as low as 60,8 cents an ounce in 19S0, The average price
of the metal in 19E0, however, was $1.01 an ounce. In 1927
another fall occurred in the price of silver, resulting in
large measure from the action of the Indian Government in
disposing of a large part of its vast silver reserves.
With the coming of the depression in 1929 silver fell again
and during the early depression years continued in the
downward direction. In 1931 silver averaged 29 cents an
ounce and in December of 1932 fell to an all time low of
24.6 cents.
The fall in the price of silver was, of course,
disappointing to the friends of the white metal. But they
were not discouraged; far from it, for the depression gave
to the champions of the white metal an undreamed-of oppor-
' tunity of presenting to the American people their case for
I
silver. In a period of prolonged business depression
people seem willing to give serious consideration to all
kinds of propositions for changing the monetary and economic
system. Not only do new theories of economics and finance
find their way into the public forum, but old ones are
freq.uently resurrected and revived. Such has been the case
with silver and not since 1896 had the public been so v/illing
to listen as the silver leaders expounded the magic powers
of the white metal.
The friends of silver claimed that the world-wide
depression was the result of the fall in commodity prices
I
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and that the fall in conmiodity prices was in turn caused
by a shortage in the supply of primary money. It is
argued that the world supply of monetary gold has failed
to increase with sufficient rapidity to meet the world’s
monetary needs and that only through the remonetization
of silver can the world be assured an adeq.uate supply of
primary money. Moreover, it is argued that if silver were
remonetized the resulting diffusion of purchasing power
among the masses of people would so increase the demand
for goods and services as to cause price levels to rise
and thereby set in motion the processes of economic re-
covery. An increase in the price of silver, it is said,
would restore the lost purchasing power of the Orient and
lead to a revival of world trade and commerce.
Such, in brief, is the case for silver: the more
money argument, the price argument, and the purchasing-
povfer-of-the-Orient argument. On the basis of these argu-
ments it has been freely predicted by the friends of sil-
ver that the way out of the depression lay in the re-
monetization of silver.
In ’’Recent Developments in the Movement to Re-
monetize Silver” we have examined the case for silver as
presented by the silver leaders and have found it to be
wanting. Our conclusions may be expressed as follows:
First : The depression was not caused by any short-
age in the supply of money, but is a complex economic
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phenomenon—the result of many causes.
Second : There is no monetary need for coining
silver since there exists a superabundance of money and
credit
.
Third : The coinage of silver would not raise
prices or hasten economic recovery except, of course, the
recovery of the price of silver.
Fourth : A high price for silver would be
harmful, not beneficial, to the silver-using countries.
The case for silver may not stand the test of
sound economics but it has been given wide acceptance in
Washington, The silver forces got no sympathy from the
Hoover Administration, but with the inauguration of the
Roosevelt Administration the silver leaders found in
Vifashington a government which was either v/illing or could
be forced to accept legislation on silver. The result
has been the passage by Congress of a series of ill con-
sidered pieces of silver legislation ranging all the way
from vesting the President with power to provide for the
free and unlimited coinage of silver at any ratio to gold
that he might fix to the nationalization of silver and
the inauguration of a program of silver purchases aimed
at building up our reserves of silver until they reach
the ratio of one to three with gold. During the past
year the government has acq_uired from at home and abroad
more than 13,000 tons of silver and is today purchasing
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newly mined domestic silver at 77.57 cents an ounce. As
a result of the government’s silver purchase policy the
world price of silver has been forced up from 43 cents an
ounce in December, 1933, to 73 cents an ounce in June,
1935.
The silver interests have just cause to be
thankful that there is in Washington a government which
has singled out the white metal for its special protec-
tion. The government’s silver purchases have benefit-
ed no one except the producers of silver and the
speculators in silver who have profited from the higher
price of the metal. The rise in the vrorld price of
silver has caused deflation and economic loss to China
and has resulted in monetary crises in other countries.
The entire silver program of the government has compli-
cated and intensified the monetary problem at home and
has failed to bring about the business recovery that was
predicted.
When it is considered that there is no mon-
etary need for the acquisition of silver, the entire
silver movement would appear to be more political than
economic in character. After all the votes of the
senators and representatives of the silver states are
sometimes important, and, in matters of monetary legis-
lation, Congress frequently acts not on the basis of
purely monetary considerations but on the basis of con-
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siderations of political expediency. Such has been the
case in the silver purchase program of the government
and it is to be feared that the American people have yet
to learn the fimdamentals of monetary economics.
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I
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Roosevelt nationalizes silver; text of proclamation,
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pp. 2436-7.
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2518, 2523-36,
Defeat of 16-1 silver remonetization amendment to
Farm Bill of 1933; debate on. Statements by Senators
Wheeler, Pittman, and others, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., Apr,
17, 1933, pp. 1804-29.
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